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COMBINED OPERATIONS

A COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE

by

NEIL C. LEWIS MAJ JDF  
BSc Royal Military College of Science 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1988

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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or the Government of Jamaica. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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To my God for his Grace.

To my Family for their tolerance.

To the Faculty for their patience.

To my sources for their candidness.

To my other typists for their help.

To Linda for her work.

The first battle is the one we are fighting now. The battle to prevent a war and that is the one we must win.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN  
Major General, USA  
4 Mar 8  
Address to  
USACGSC



## THESIS ABSTRACT

**COMBINED OPERATIONS: A COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE:** The problems of the Commonwealth Caribbean in the successful integration of their small forces and large forces in combined operations.

by Major N.C. Lewis, Jamaica Defense Force,        pages.

This study is done against the background of a new recognition in the Commonwealth Caribbean of the defense needs of the region. It will examine the historical background of the regions threat, problems of regional interoperability and problems of operability with potential large nation allies. The 1983 rescue of Grenada will be examined, as will the Regions current defense posture. A hypothetical threat situation will also be developed based on the border dispute between Guatemala and Belize. Solutions will then be proposed based on the analysis.

Because of the small demographic base and generally weak economies a totally autonomous defense structure is out of the question. This leaves the ruling elites of the region with the inevitability of alliances with larger forces. Balancing alliances and developing forces that are capable of operating with a range of potential allies in a variable political climate requires either full political integration or a structure that gives the ruling elites sufficient flexibility to exercise some political independence without degrading military efficiency.

The study concludes that a structure headed by a regional Prime Ministers panel would supervise and direct a regional defense system through a permanent civilian secretariat and a military General staff. The smaller states would raise and maintain reserve forces and the larger states would maintain permanent forces. Coastguard and some Air assets would be permanent forces. The entire system would be run from a permanent headquarters which would do day to day operations, force development and integration, training and mobilization. Particular emphasis would be placed on command post training in association with potential extra-regional allies and the integration of military development with economic development. Also responsiveness to the mobilization requirement is important as is strategic intelligence to help optimize the force development effort. finally the proposal is so designed that the recommendations respond to the perceived political will of the component nations.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: MINISTATES IN A WIDER WORLD

#### INTRODUCTION

The Commonwealth Caribbean is a loosely defined group of mini and microstates sprinkled throughout the Caribbean Basin. They maintain a common identity though being distinctly multi-racial having belonged to the British Empire. They are all members of the Commonwealth.

Because of this British Heritage their size and location (in the shadow of the United States) they have had no traditional responsibility for defense. They have been involved in Britains many colonial and modern wars by contributing locally raised ground units, Airmen and sailors to the British effort. In World War One the then British West Indies contributed fully eleven infantry battalions to both the European and Middle Eastern theatres, from a demographic base of about two million persons.

In the present day Commonwealth Caribbean, however, the question as to defense was for many years dwarfed into insignificance by the chronic economic and political problems facing the region. Recent events have forced a new look at the problems posed in the area of Commonwealth Caribbean security. Events are also forcing a renewed look at Commonwealth Caribbean integration.

In considering integration and or combined defense

posture the Commonwealth Caribbean potentially includes the States of Belize, the Cayman Islands and Jamaica in the West. To the north, Bermuda, the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos. To the east the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) of St Kitts/Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada along with their associated states of the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla and Monsterat all grouped with the larger states of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Guyana, a traditionally peripheral Commonwealth Caribbean State is also a potential member.

The status and condition of these states is laid out in Annex A where their geographic and demographic profile is detailed. Also outlined are representative slices of their economic conditions and security postures.

It is easy to take advantage of the "Pax Americana" in an era of relative international stability. It is easy to ignore under these conditions security needs until they raise their ugly heads. The ruling elites of this region cannot however continue to abrogate in large measure the wider implications and full scope of their potential defense responsibility. It is important to at least examine and plan for the various contingencies within existing economic and political constraints.

#### POLARIZATION OF THE MODERN WORLD

The world after World War One was changed, never again World War on that scale occur! The great powers

(There were no super powers then) formed that great preventative palliative the League of Nations, and no more would Industrial Nations bash each other into spiritual, social and economic exhaustion! The resurgence of Right Wing Nationalism in Europe and the explosion of World War Two shattered the illusion of a world without war. The result was that two successive and totally exhausting wars within twenty years of each other left the world without great powers, and with the advent of the Nuclear Weapon, the Superpowers were born.

The exponential increase in destructive power brought on by the Atom Bomb and the subsequent quantum leap provided by the Hydrogen Bomb, by all logical assessments should have spelled the end, or seriously degrade the importance of and hence emphasis on conventional forces. However the memory of the worlds unpreparedness for World War Two caused first, flirtation with Tactical Nuclear war as a doctrine and subsequent versions of it such as graduated response or conventional war growing into nuclear war.

The world was now polarized into two mutually hostile spheres and each prepared on the European front for war with each other while in the political arena the United Nations, a more all-embracing child of the League of Nations grappled with the principles of ensuring universal justice in the International arena. The basic problem was how to ensure the administration of

international justice through the primacy of negotiation. This however foundered on twin stumbling blocks. The first was that of competing political systems which espoused the same overt pursuit of an ideal society for mankind, free of oppression and providing equal opportunity, for all. The second was resurgent Nationalism which found expression in a constantly changing world political map. In fact post World War II world leaders were generally driven by an altruism that caused the careers of many to founder on the reality of world competition economically and politically. Nehru of India in trying to preserve an opportunity for nations to pursue the altruistic notion of world peace in the absence of this polarization of the globe into superpower spheres, led in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Even this movement it can be argued is polarized acrosss super power lines.

#### POST-COLONIAL GLOBAL FRAGMENTATION

Concurrent with the general political polarization of the globe into east, west and at least nominally non-aligned there was the other stumbling block of the fragmentation of the world into specialized international groupings based on politics and economics and more importantly, fragmentation due to decolonization. Colonization and the increase of the world population had brought with it defined geographical boundaries for the first time in some parts of the world. The boundaries



created by European colonization were very often in direct competition with each other and with the indigenous population groupings, which were generally characterized as tribalistic, socially and religiously fragmented. In many instances nations were created where non previously existed. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan<sup>1</sup> is an example. Another problem concerned the way many of these colonies were governed. Generally government was highly centralized on the colonizing power which ruled through local governors and whose primary responsibility to the central government was, certainly<sup>2</sup> in Britains case purely commercial. This made the interest of the indigenous populations secondary and in some instances of no concern. The wholesale transportation/migration of persons of different races willy-nilly across the spectrum of the colonies created highly stratified multiracial and multicultural societies.

#### THE MINISTATE SYNDROME

The post colonial world brought with it an incredible plethora of mini (up to 200,000 persons) and<sup>3</sup> micro (up to 100,000 persons) states, multiracial states, states with members of the same cultural and national groupings spanning national borders. States whose economies are narrow and highly specialized and therefore very fragile or not viable at all in the modern global economy. In addition the escape valve of

relatively free migration that was characteristic of the colonial and near post-colonial period no longer pertains.

These factors have all contrived to create enormous social, political, religious, and economic tensions largely within the new nations of the world. These tensions have become the playground of the superpowers in their ideological competition. They create an incredible security dilemma for the governing elites and generally defy the implementation of popularly based democratic governments in the mold of western democratic systems. The tensions have led to the general characterization of the governing elites of the new nations as dictatorial and militarily based. These tensions express themselves in internal, regional, and (sometimes threaten) global conflict. Forced to pursue the prosecution of these conflicts or the potential for them, the ruling elites of the new nations, governing unsophisticated economies must turn to the developed world for military, economic and political support. This at one time generally translated into turning either to the east or the west, the US or the USSR. There have, however, been alternatives within these two spheres and the overall picture is today being complicated by the burgeoning ascendancy of nations like China and India who are creating political polarizations that recall the 19th century era of the great powers.

For small nations this on the one hand provides them

with wider political options but on the other it reduces the diplomatic clout of the superpowers and the more traditional powers and consequently increases the anxiety of the superpowers over conflicts or potential conflicts within their traditional spheres of influence.

#### STABILITY AND ECONOMICS

Another major factor impacting the response of the large nations to the tensions of the new nations<sup>4</sup> is the heavy dependence of the western economic system on stability in the world, particularly in regions where critical natural resources or vital trade routes are located. The particularization and "bottom up" (market oriented) regulation of the International Capital and Commodity markets is so heavily dependent on market confidence that it requires inordinate political/military protection to maintain economic stability. This makes the present economic security of the western nations very sensitive to international, regional and local instability

Western nations have also been made extremely sensitive to any accusation of resurgent imperialism through the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union which has not (unlike the west) withdrawn from its continental and therefore far more accessible and governable empire. This sensitively results in a usually painful search for legitimacy in the pursuit of the political stability required for economic security. This

in particular applies to use of military power or political/economic coercion in the attempt to influence the conflicts that result from the post colonial tensions.

#### POLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND SECURITY

The majority of the wars since World War Two have resulted from either the pursuit of the ideological ideals or the tensions of the post-colonial global society. They have, in comparison, been small wars and have invariably drawn international attention and in many instances international participation. The ideal of an effective combative United Nations militarily capable of peace making and the enforcement of international law perished in the aftermath of the Korean and Congo experiences. This has resulted in the political polarization of these conflicts and any accompanying international participation in them. In the case of those new nations whose domestic political polarization spans the full range of the ideological spectrum this creates an additional security problem of alliances, begging the question; to what extent should any nation become dependent on, or align itself with one side or the other?

The active or latent destabilization that exists throughout the world has consequences that exist to varying degrees at the local (or internal) national level, regional level and international level and those

small nations that get caught up in these areas of destabilization are virtually compelled into alliance with larger nations in order to ensure a viable security posture.

The fact is that the present day focus of western and eastern security attention is on those areas that are particularly sensitive to either side. In the case of each super power and the polarization that they represent, these sensitive areas can be viewed as either offensive or defensive and in the majority of cases for the west these are defensive. It could be argued that the desire of the super powers to be involved in or to ensure the security of those areas of the world in which there is destabilization increases in proportion to the perceived threat to these nations economic, political and geographic security. Ensuring that the Global (Western) economic system remains stable usually therefore takes precedence over dealing with other areas of destabilization in which the motive for resolution is more politically altruistic. It follows from this that the Persian Gulf takes precedence over Southern Africa. Those interests therefore that have an interest in the security of an area spend considerable effort justifying how their particular interest impacts on the economic and political security of the west, in order to claim attention to their interest.

## THE WEST RESPONDING TO DESTABILIZATION

In the Persian Gulf the potential for major disruption of the international economy or it being held to ransom by an expanding Soviet regime, is great, hence the international interest and presence. From the point of view of the states in the region, general destabilization is only just held in check. As the regional states battle the tensions of decolonization, they find themselves unable to individually provide for their own defense against the larger antagonist nations in the present situation, particularly Iran. Collectively the entire Saudi Arabsian Peninsula have found themselves unable to guarantee their own security against a destabilizing Iran/Iraq war or potentially an expanding Soviet Union. The result has been their actively courting the western nations especially the United States. At the same time they can be seen playing a delicate political balancing act to maintain their political independence. This has resulted in incomplete alliances and only day to day decision making regarding the level and extent of cooperation in defense matters with the supporting nations. Also notable in the Persian Gulf is the inability of the NATO alliance to overtly operate in the Gulf as an alliance, resulting in many of the maritime capable partners ostensibly operating individually.

On the other hand the situation in Southern Africa

although it bears the seeds of destabilization of the western economies this potential is less of an immediate threat than the situation in the Persian Gulf. Hence, it can be argued there is less international interest in a resolution to the current apartheid problems with its attendant insurgency movements, and civil violence. It is notable that the potential for western military intervention in Southern Africa is so remote as to be practically unmentionable. It is also notable that the western nations stand to lose economically in the short term in any commitment to the altruism of establishing a just and representative Southern African society.

#### STABILITY AND CARIBBEAN BASIN

Central America unlike the Persian Gulf or Southern Africa but like Europe actually has a US land forces command in place outside the United States. Southern Command or SOUTHCOM is deployed in the defense of that vital economic and strategic link, the Panama Canal. Unlike Europe however, there is little real joint military cooperation with Regional Forces in this defense and in 1988 time the Regime that was the greatest threat to the security of the canal had been traditionally the senior partner in this security. The situation surrounding the standoff between General Noriega's Panama and the United States, typifies the wide swings of politics on both sides that can occur in this region. The undoubted strategic importance of the Central

American/Caribbean region makes it a very sensitive area for the US. On the other hand the greater immediacy of the threat in the outlying areas of US global responsibilities demands the forward deployment of US forces and the attention of US planners in resource allocation.

Decolonization has in this region as in the Persian Gulf and Africa resulted in a highly fragmented political geography with several outstanding ex-colonial Border and territorial disputes.

This region has also been a ripe field for the prosecution of the ideological assault of the East on the west. There are therefore a vast array of violent Marxist revolutionary movements, facing off against a constantly changing pattern of military regimes or militarily backed civilian regimes. This description has been generally typical of the Latin Nations in the region and less so of the French and Dutch Nations. The English Nations have traditionally been the most stable block of nations in the region. All have boasted multi-party democratic systems emphasizing subordination of the military to civil government. These systems are supported by a (sometimes too) vibrant political life. They have espoused traditional western human rights values and have economies with generally better domestic infrastructure, social services, per-capita income and literacy rates than their Latin neighbors.



The result of this difference based not only on the ethno-cultural background but more particularly on the smaller demographic base, smaller area to defend and historical lack of defense responsibility has created vast imbalances between the level of armament and military sophistication of the Latin military forces in opposition to the military capability of the English speaking nations.

The major factor complicating regional stability as has been alluded to rest with those nations that have become independent since World War Two and the question of their viability as nations.

#### SMALLNESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Since World War Two over forty new nations have<sup>5</sup> joined the international community that fall into the<sup>6</sup> category of mini/micro states. Initially the United Nations contemplated establishing special status for these nations. It was recognized that there was no established definition of nationhood as it applies to an aspiring nations' economic demographic, military and general political viability. The problem, however,<sup>7</sup> proved intractable not only to the United Nations, but to the Commonwealth of Nations to which grouping the majority of these new and very small states belonged. This situation is in some instances taken to ridiculous extremes. Apart from being unable to fulfill their reasonable international obligations in membership of

international organizations, many 'sovereign' nations are  
unable to provide for basic<sup>8</sup> domestic requirements  
such as legal draftsmen who are required to draft the  
very laws upon which statehood is founded because of  
narrow demographic base. In fact too many states because  
of their smallness end up being the fiefdoms of narrow<sup>9</sup>  
political elites or petty tyrants largely because  
their institutional infrastructure is too narrow to  
permit the effective application of a viable democratic  
system. The internal tensions of decolonization are  
therefore exacerbated with decreasing size quite often in  
a potentially explosive fashion as happened in Grenada in  
1979 and more recently in Fiji. Establishing the  
economic base necessary to promote stability and hence  
security, in the absence of some resource windfall is  
increasingly costly. The resulting economies are  
generally fragile as evidenced by the large number of  
small nations that are classified by the United Nations<sup>8</sup>  
as least developed nations. It is incredible that  
many of these states compare unfavorably with many of the  
large multinational corporations with which they are  
required to deal in a regulatory sense. There are many  
individuals in the western world that control resources  
that far exceed those available to small states. This  
means that the potential block of external threats to the  
security of small states can vary anywhere on the  
spectrum from an offended individual to an offended super

power, operating on either a legal or illegal basis.

The existence of so many small sovereign nations many located in those regions that are of vital interest either economically or politically to either power bloc contributes to international tension, as well as to the local internal tensions of these regions and states. This international tension leads to a kind of nervousness over the potential for destabilization. This in turn leads to intervention of one kind or another by the large nations and a correspondingly hostile reaction by those states 'interfered with' and whatever Bloc the 'wronged' nation is associated with. In the case of the small states, expression of their abhorrence at interference in their affairs by the Power Blocs is made in the United Nations and in other forums such as the Commonwealth of Nations, where they have an equal say with the larger nations.

Because of this post-colonial tendency to respond with an anti-imperialist backlash to the perception of interference, western nations in particular, are very sensitive to the effects of world opinion to any initiative they may make to influence regional stability. This applies to those regions that are of interest to them and in their traditional sphere of influence. This nervousness generally leads to a search for legitimacy through either an unchallengeable moral rightness as in the UK and the Falklands or large

nation/small nation international solidarity on the situation in question as in the Persian Gulf. There are occasions however, when the super powers and or their associates commit to send a message that there are limits beyond which they are not prepared to go as in the overt case of the US bombing raid on Libya and more covertly the French bombing of the Greenpeace ship in Auckland New Zealand.

#### INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

The simplistic gravitation of the world in World War Two into two camps facing a common enemy (which was being rapidly annihilated), led in the weariness of war to a false hope. This hope was that the new found atmosphere of international cooperation would persist through the establishment of regulatory international institutions. The institutions would ensure the continuance of international cooperation without the need to again resort to war. Hope rested in the foundation of the United Nations and its pre-eminent child the International Court of Justice. The reality of the geo-political chaos that resulted from the Post War decolonization lead directly to these institutions losing their way and becoming primarily the pri-maddona forums for international Political Rhetoric. This is particularly so as the idealistic security efforts of the United Nations frequently founder on the stumbling Blocks of Super Power confrontation and a representation base

that is insufficiently representative of real world politics. The International Court of Justice on the other hand has had the statutes it upholds and interprets described as a system of law that is 'neither orphan nor harlot' 'neither Jailer nor never-never land'.<sup>10</sup> The very complex multidimensioned international Political System has defied all the regulatory efforts of the above international Institutions<sup>11</sup>. Resolution of international conflicts has evaded not only the effort of institutionalized arbitration but unilateral military intervention as well. It is far easier in these times for interested nations to achieve only sufficient multilateral consensus to resolve a particular situation than to sometimes suicidally await the arbitration of an international institution that does not necessarily command the allegiance of the participants to its guiding statutes. The precedence that an individual nation's national interest takes often wins out over these states willingness to submit matters to the arbitration of International Law. The above mentioned superpower conflict often nullifies any effectiveness of the United Nations to mediate conflicts as either superpower will frequently intervene with veto power on behalf of that Nation within its Bloc. Those Nations with the military and economic means to deal with their own conflicts are also reluctant to submit their disputes to the International Institutions. In the event they do they

are frequently reluctant to adhere to those decisions that go contrary to their interests. The cases of Guatemala/Belize<sup>12</sup> and Venezuela/Guyana are notable.

#### NATIONAL WILL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The main element that determines the attitude of the ruling elites to the appropriate foreign policy approach is that element of National Power National Will. It is a factor that plays a part in every society regardless of global polarization. This is particularly so in those cases that involve military intervention. There is some<sup>13</sup>

evidence for example that a major contributing factor to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was the response of the Soviet populace to the loss of life. The totalitarian nature of the Soviet government could not hope to suppress the negative messages sent by returning veterans and returning corpses. The more open western democracies are however traditionally more immediately susceptible to the power of National will. In these democracies in deference to the general short sightedness of the general public there is a usual inordinate search for the kind of justification for intervention that will marshal the power of national will to the cause. This justification must at least stave off the political backlash until the correspondingly short political memory of the general public has lapsed into forgetfulness as per the US in Grenada. On the other hand Interventions must be

carefully calculated to ensure that the potential for losing this public support by long aimless interventions is reduced to a minimum. Vietnam is the classic case in point.

## END NOTES

### CHAPTER ONE

1. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was formed out of the stalemating of the rival tribal dynasties in their struggle to re-establish the old Islamic Caliphate. King Hussein of Jordan still maintains a claim to the Saudi Arabian throne.
2. See Parry & Sherlock. A Short History of the West Indies for an excellent development of Britains Colonial interests.
3. Commonwealth Consultative Group. Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society P9. (Hereinafter referred to as 'Vulnerability').
4. See the Stages of Economic Growth by WW Rostow. Cambridge Univerisy Press and Free Enterprise without poverty by Leonard M. Greene.
5. Commonwealth Secretariat: Notes on the Commonwealth: Commonweealth Support for small countries. (hereinafter referred to as 'Commonwealth Support').
6. See 'Vulnerability' chapter one.
7. Ball. The Open Commonwealth. page 12.
8. See 'Commonwealth Support.'
9. Garirys Grenada is a prime example of a widely ridiculed Head of State apparently manipulating an accessible state machinery to his advantage. See also Shoenhals & Melanson. Chapter 2.
10. See Duetsch & Hoffman. The Relevance of International Law p.124.
11. See Deutsh & Hoffman (Ed). The Relevance of International Law. Preface to the Anchor Edition.
12. See development of these scenarios in Chapter Four.
13. Time Magazine. In search of the nearest exit Jan 18, 1988 page 31 New York Times Magazine. Home from Afghanistan: Russia's divisive War Feb 14, 1988 page 24.



## CHAPTER TWO

### THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN THREAT SPECTRUM

#### BACKGROUND OF THE THREAT TO THE REGION

The Caribbean Region, the Commonwealth Caribbean in particular has suffered as much as any from the effects of post World War Two decolonization and the political, social and economic tensions that have resulted. The region has also been caught up in the ideological east west conflict and occupy a strategically sensitive lifeline straddling as it does the approach to the Panama Canal and the North and South Atlantic access to the Gulf Ports.<sup>1</sup>

The political and demographic development of the region was far from homogenous across those states that comprise the Commonwealth Caribbean Region. The Colonies changed hands from Spain to Britain, France, Holland and between Britain France and Holland, many times, as in the case of Dominica. Correspondingly, because of the generally inhospitable nature of the tropical Continental land mass international boundary definition and demographic expansion has been slow on the South and Central American mainland. This has resulted in the potential for territorial claims by Latin America on some parts of the English speaking Caribbean.<sup>2</sup>

The demographic/political evolution of the Region is

also notable in that the enforced and induced immigration of different races and cultures over different periods has created a moving scale of racial harmony throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean. Barbados and Jamaica for example had been in British hands since 1624 and 1655<sup>3</sup> respectively and this enabled the thorough 'naturalization' of successive generations of first, white english indentured servants and African Negroes with the subsequent addition of proportionally smaller numbers of Indian and Chinese labourers in the late 1800s.<sup>4</sup> These latter two came with the demise of slavery. This resulted in a relatively stable and carefully graduated and stratified social scale based largely on skin color and wealth. A long history of representative parliamentary democracy (particularly so in Barbados) also evolved in harmony with the demographic changes to result in multiparty Westminster style democratic systems, that are today amongst the most stable and reliable in the world. Institutions such as a free press so important to the successful functioning of Westminster style democracies have also had time to develop and become entrenched in the social values of these societies. They therefore boast in addition to a free press vibrant tradesunion movements, and other traditional commercial and professional interest groups to 'firm up' the democratic tradition. At the other end of the scale Grenada and Guyana have been relatively

recent additions to British Caribbean territories, 1783 and 1803 respectively. Trinidad and Tobago also a recent (1797) addition is of note. These nations can be characterized by a certain tentativeness in their application of the Westminster style democratic systems and in the case of Guyana and Grenada a repudiation of the system together. This notwithstanding the forcible return of Grenada to the traditional style in 1983. It is also notable that the party politics of Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana are divided along racial lines more or less equally between Negroes and East Indians. Both Grenada and Guyana have had military organisations that have been closely associated with the ruling Governments and Dominica has had the most serious military coup attempts in the Region. These have resulted in  
5  
convictions. It is also notable that Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada and Guyana for a long time were ruled exclusively by one party. Change only came in Trinidad subsequent to the death of Dr. Eric Williams and in Grenada with the New Jewel Movement. It has not yet come to Guyana even though the legendary Forbes Burnham is now dead. The politics of Guyana is also notable in that the East Indian party is avowedly Marxist and ruling Negro party practices extreme socialism.

The economics of the region has had a far more  
6  
unfortunate development. As has been indicated the economics of the component colonies of the Commonwealth

Caribbean were usually very narrow and formed (a sometimes) viable section in the British Economy as a whole. The Colonial period therefore saw careful control of trade by the British Government in order to maintain the viability of colonial economies. However, even prior to decolonization the lobby for free trade and the demise of slavery combined to put severe pressures on Commonwealth Caribbean countries that today face the problems of the narrow colonial economic base.

7  
Additionally combining selective emigration with a narrow demographic base and a dearth of exploitable natural resources, makes many of these newly decolonized nations non-viable economically and unstable politically. On the positive side in the case of Guyana and Belize the potential for the discovery and exploitation of natural resources is great and Trinidad possesses significant oil resources.

The transition of the region through the period of decolonization saw an attempt at West Indian  
8  
(Commonwealth Caribbean) Federation. The lack of any British tradition of Regional government, inability of component colonies to agree on basic national principles such as inter-component migration coupled with a naive political optimism of the post war international atmosphere, lead to the early demise of the Federation. It also created a go it alone style with the larger more potentially viable nations particularly Jamaica

and Guyana. Very few Regional Institutions survived the demise of the Federation.

The Federal Defense Force was based on the old West India Regiment which had seen action in the Carolinas in the American War of Independence, and in Britains many colonial wars became the germ of West Indian Regional Defense. With the demise of the Federation the newly reformed three battalion West India Regiment was broken up with the 1st and 3rd Battalions going to Jamaica to form the Jamaica Regiment as the core of the Jamaica Defense Force. The 2nd Battalion went to Trinidad and Tobago as the core of the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force. The notable thing about this dissolution, however, is that the Jamaica Defense Force Officer Corps in particular has retained an extensive Regional flavor as a number of these officers had decidedly settled in Jamaica where the regiment was first based. It was one of these officers that subsequently was encouraged to return to Barbados to be instrumental in the initial formation of the Regional Security System and to be Chief of Staff of the expanding Barbados Defense Force. A number of ex-pilots of the Jamaica Defense Force Air Wing were also lured to Barbados to assist in the formation of the now defunct Air Wing there. It was also one of these officers, a Trinidadian by birth, who first commanded the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force in Operation Urgent Fury.

8

Unfortunately the Federation dissolved before any

real thought could be given to comprehensive regional defense planning, particularly Naval Defense and the troublesome matter of basing and strategic movement of Ground Forces. In fact a considerable proportion of the attention of the West Indian/British negotiation on defense centered around the need for British assistance and the unacceptability of any potential for the new Federation taking on any responsibility for the defense of Belize which was not at that time a prospective member of the Federation.

9

10

There has been a renewed trend toward Regional integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean that has been spurred primarily by the impact of the reality and competitiveness of the Global economy. The intergration has surrounded the primarily economic grouping of the original customs union the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). This has been succeeded by the more general CARICOM or Caribbean community. There have also been other attempts at Regional integration primary among these being the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) which was formed in 1981 to promote general sub- regional integration by having a common currency and cooperating in matters of Defense and Foreign policy. It is notable that Maurice Bishop's Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) was a signatory to this Pact.

#### THREAT FROM THE LEFT

Maurice Bishop's PRG had come to Power in Grenada by

a nearly bloodless coup in 1979 ousting the widely ridiculed Sir Eric Gairy who, because of the afore-mentioned national limitations had managed to manipulate the democratic process in his favor. Maurice Bishop, a charming, well educated, intellectual, had his early political moulding in high school with his close friend and subsequent rival Bernard Coard. Bishop's political activity peaked before the coup when he emerged as the leader of the union of two opposition groups into what became known as the new Jewel Movement. Early in the morning of March 13, 1979 the military wing of the New Jewel movement headed by Hudson Austin assaulted the True Blue Army Camp with Molotov Cocktails and a miscellaneous assortment of weapons imported from the United States, they later seized the Radio Station and began consolidating what was an initially popular revolution or 'Revo' in Grenadian parlance.

The ensuing drift to the left by the New Jewel Movement and the process to convert Grenada into a Marxist state is well documented. It is safe to say that the subsequent self-destruction of the PR6 and the installation of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) was due primarily to the naive idealism of yet another group of young West Indian politicians collapsing in the face of the real world problems of governing a post colonial mini-state with a narrow economic and political base.

The 1970's and 80's, however, saw a new awareness of the vulnerability the Commonwealth Caribbean States and the near irrelevance of their sovereignty when a series of incidents and developments caused the ruling elites to re-evaluate their posture on defense and security. Cuban activism increased significantly in the 1970's with Cubas involvement in Central America and in Africa. Offense in the Commonwealth Caribbean was caused by Cuba surreptitiously using Barbados in 1975 to stage 5000<sup>1</sup> troops to Angola<sup>10</sup>. This resulted in Bilateral discussions on Defense Cooperation between Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. In 1980 an attempted coup by an ex-prime minister, members of the 80 man army and US gambling and drug interests shook Dominica and resulted in the disbanding of the Army. In the spring of 1970 a coup motivated by the Black Power Movement in the US found some support in the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment resulting in the arrest of two officers and 87 other ranks. These were tried by an ordinary Court Martial that included Commonwealth participation. Some were sentenced but were later acquitted by the Court of Appeal. This resulted in the near discrediting of the Army but not the Coast Guard which had been instrumental in halting the Rebel march. It now appears that the coup had been more a spontaneous mutiny than an organized coup attempt. The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard therefore tends to get a higher priority and engender greater trust



from the central government than the army. Even more significant however was the 1980 incident in which a Cuban Mig, ostensibly mistaking a Bahamian Patrol boat for Cuban exile Pirates sank the patrol boat and strafed the sailors in the water. This was followed up by a helicopter assault on one of Bahama's outer islands. By late 1980 the direction of the PR6 in Grenada was clearly alarming Regional leaders with the potential for a repeat of the Grenadian 'Revo' in their own small countries. Much more alarming was the apparent military build-up in Grenada and the increasing shipments of arms to the island and the involvement of East Block countries in the domestic affairs of the island. All these conspired to spawn and accelerate, the trend toward regional defense cooperation in the Eastern Caribbean. The OECS nations recognizing their collective impotence in the matter of defense sought the assistance of a senior partner in their defense arrangements. This new eagerness found expression in the so-called 'Adams Doctrine'. This holds that 'threats to the small democracies will not come from external forces directly but from their critically-timed assistance to the small groups at home who would subvert democracy'. This regional cooperation was first exercised against a leftist rebellion in Union island part of the St. Vincent and Grenadines. The rebels had actually invaded Union island from the Grenadian island of Carriacou. Elements of the Barbados Defense Force

were flown in to help quell the rebellion and the invaders were arrested. The leader fled to Grenada, but presumably in order not to become 'odious' to the Caribbean community he was handed over to the Vincentian authorities by the then young Bishop Regime. This eventually lead to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Regional Security System or RSS. The signatures were Barbados and all the Independent States of the OECS except Grenada. The Adams doctrine under the RSS began to take shape and evolved from being based primarily on a small mobile force "which counts speed as its most effective asset", to this mobility being supplemented by permanently formed 40 man Security Service Units (SSUs) which were simply para-military units of policemen. These policemen were constantly rotated from the 'beat' to the SSU in order to reduce the potential for coups.

The Bahamian incident coupled with the inability of the US Navy and Coast Guard to control the Cuban boatlift served to highlight and accentuate the naval vulnerability of Region in the sight of the ruling elites. This coupled with the memory of the havoc wrought by the German UBoats on US shipping in the Caribbean nearly 5000 miles from their home bases in World War Two has further exacerbated Commonwealth Caribbean insecurity.

By the time the Peoples Revolutionary Government

fell apart the more pragmatic and popular Bishop had recognized that the program of communist indoctrination was 'not taking' and there was increasing resistance to the programs of 're-educating the youth' from the church which is very strong in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The symptoms of Grenadan dissatisfaction with the revolution included; declining attendance at militia camps and parades and an increasingly loud voice of dissent primarily emanating from the pulpit. Bishop saw the need for tempering the communist re-education and walking a fine diplomatic line with an increasingly hostile US Government which had pointedly excluded Grenada from the Caribbean Basin initiative (CBI). The hard line Marxists in the regime saw it otherwise and it is possible that a reluctant (or fearful) Deputy Prime Minister Coard was pushed into opposition to Bishop. After this events went out of control with results that are well known. The most notable aspect of the short term of the PR6 and RMC in Grenada however was the extent of the revolutionary fervour in the Commonwealth Caribbean and its propensity for conducting the violent replacement of the elected governments of the region, in keeping with traditional  
12  
Marxist/Leninism.

#### IS THERE ANOTHER THREAT?

Based on the above it appears that the central question that should be asked by Commonwealth Caribbean Ruling elites is: What measures need to be taken to

guarantee the peace and security of the component states? Emanating from that is; to what extent can the governments in the region expect to guarantee their own security? In the same way it was easy for the Adams doctrine to conclude that the only immediate threat was that of destabilization of small government by powerful interest groups in association with disaffected minorities, so it is easy to assume away the larger threat of wholesale invasion by a larger power because in this present international atmosphere this possibility is remote. This however should lead defense planners to ask the question: What changes in the International Atmosphere would make this possibility immediate?

In other words what is the full scope of the threat to the Commonwealth Caribbean, what measures must be taken to deal with this threat? What limitations and compromises must be applied to these measures in order to preserve the political identity that a defense policy is required to preserve in any case?

It is very easy to focus virtually all threat attention on Cuba and the potential for left wing destabilization. It is unlikely with the proximity of the United States that any overt Cuban Military moves can be expected in the Caribbean Region. It is not however impossible as the Bahamian incident clearly indicates. In this instance the Coastal Patrol of a Caribbean Nation was defenseless against the sophisticated modern weaponry

of a modern airforce. Grenada clearly demonstrated that with a little encouragement Cuba can be involved to whatever military extent necessary and feasible to ensure the success of Marxist encroachments. Although Grenada was a set-back it can be guaranteed that if a similar opportunity is presented in the future that the Marxist plan will be more carefully implemented politically and militarily but with the same aggressiveness that was planned for the population of Grenada, the Eastern Caribbean and indeed the whole Commonwealth Caribbean.

Next to the threat of Cuban or Cuban sponsored aggression there are a range of other potential bank-rollers of violence in the Caribbean from Muammar<sup>13</sup> Ghadaffy of Lybia through the North Korean Regime of<sup>14</sup> Kim Il Sung and the range of drug and gambling interests that have become so pervasive and powerful in<sup>15</sup> these times. They have already made their powerful presence felt in Dominica as they have all over South and Central America.

#### THREAT FROM THE RIGHT<sup>16</sup>

Over on the right there are the ex-colonial border disputes that have been brought over from the period of ill-defined colonial boundaries. The most major of these are the disputes between Venezuela and Guyana and between Belize and Guatemala. Both these claims have effectively prevented the full normalization of relations between the Ex-British West Indies and Latin America. There are

other minor border disputes whose activation is largely contingent on developments in the others such as, Guyana/Suriname, Brazil/Guyana, Venezuela/Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico/Guatemala.

In the case of Guyana/Venezuela, the dispute concerns nearly two thirds of the territory of Guyana which has already been the subject of extensive arbitration with the US as the main Mediator. The Venezuelan perception that the US was more pro-Britain in the arbitration has prevented the matter from being concluded. Venezuela has committed itself to seeking resolution of the matter by arbitration<sup>17</sup> rather than by military means, although there continue to be accusations of territorial encroachments by both sides. More importantly however, has been Venezuelan efforts to rapidly colonise the areas adjacent to the disputed borders in order to prepare a future case that they have better land utilization and greater population pressure. The Venezuelan Government has also been very active in wooing the native Indian tribes in the disputed area. The Guyanese governments response to the 'disloyal Indian tribes was particularly harsh and included the banning of the Amerrindian Association of Guyana or Amerindian<sup>10</sup> Party. This gentel subversion and careful preparation can be expected to continue on the Venezuelan side until conditions are deemed right for the outright annexation of the area. US hostility to the domestic

politics of Guyana and the strong support that Venezuela receives in military terms from the US complicates the issue from a Commonwealth Caribbean perspective. It can probably be safely said that the present International Atmosphere precludes any unprovoked attempt by Venezuela to unilaterally impose it's will on a smaller weaker Guyana. However, it can also be concluded that if the opportunity does present itself for Venezuela to press its claim then this will open the way for Suriname and even Brazil to press their own claims on a weakened Guyana.

Two thousand miles away at the other end of the Commonwealth Caribbean is Belize known to successive Guatemalan regimes as the 23rd Department of Guatemala. Recognition of Belize has been hampered since 1745 by an aggressive Guatemalan attitude to this recognition and to Belizean independence. This has required the continuing stationing of British troops in Belize even though Belize has been independent since 1981. In 1978 Prime Minister George Price approached the governments of the Commonwealth Caribbean and received from them a security<sup>19</sup> guarantee. Cuba has also consistently extended offers of cooperation in matters of defence to both Belize and Guyana, but these nations have in large measure resisted these advances in fear of US response. To date Guatemala which has fought a low level civil war against a 'potpourri' of insurgency groups at a cost of

over 20,000 lives, has a military that has been traditionally a very strong force in Guatemalan political affairs.<sup>20</sup> It comprises a largely conscript enlisted group commanded by a close knit and highly professional officer corps. This officer corps has been described as "united by extreme nationalism, strong anti-Americanism,<sup>20</sup> and an intense corporate bond". The Anti-Americanism is often suppressed in deference to US assistance but has been known to flare up when it is perceived that the US is attempting to bully Guatemala rather than treat it as an equal partner. The Belizean situation has now<sup>20</sup> become a major element in Guatemalan nationalism. This is particularly so since the passage of UN<sup>19</sup> resolution 35/20 which guarantees Belizean independence. The situation however can provide a beleaguered Guatemalan government and the cohesive Guatemalan military with a convenient nationalistic rallying point. This they could conceivably extend to rallying the rebel groups behind the National government. The additional complication to the Belizean situation is that Mexico's dormant claim to the Northern section of Belize will be activated in the event the Guatemalans pursue their own claim. It is also likely that if the opportunity presents itself Guatemala may seek to press a partial claim which includes the potentially oil rich Punta Gorda Region which was offered in part settlement by Britain and withdrawn because of



Belizean objection. Again it must be pointed out that American sentiment is traditionally allied to the Guatemalan cause rather than the Belizean although Guatemalan aggression has been held in check by American restraint. American leverage on Guatemala has been known to wane as in 1960 when Guatemala unilaterally reduced its dependence on American Aid in relation to the American use of Guatemalan territory as a staging base for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. <sup>19</sup> They have also diversified their arms purchasing base, increasingly going outside the US for arms supply, notably to Israel.

#### THREAT FROM BELOW

Another main threat that defies US military and political dominance rests in those elements of aberrant ideological and commercial/criminal activity that enjoy far more resources than many of the individual governments in the Region. This is largely consequential to the 'smallness' of Commonwealth Caribbean states. These interests seek to utilize the political shelter of the small states in order to cover their activities from the scrutiny of the US and other interested Nations or institutions. Their approach is generally to involve themselves in the political lives of the states primarily through their financial clout and the potential of these resources to corrupt entire governments. It is far less expensive for these interests to achieve their ends in this way in the smaller nations rather than attempt to do

it in the larger nations. This kind of vulnerability has manifested itself a number of times in the region. The commercial dominance of the Alumina multinationals in Jamaica, the present dominance of the Coca Cola Company in Belize are examples of real or latent vulnerabilities through commercial interests. The effects of these on the domestic security of the nations can be seen in the way the Jamaican Governments pressure on the Alumina Multinations in the 1970's contributed considerably to the commercial collapse of Jamaica and the fall of that Government.<sup>21</sup> The existing dispute over real estate properties between the present Jamaican Government and a Wealthy Republican Businessman<sup>22</sup> has caused the effective choking off of US economic aid to Jamaica through the instrumentality of a Democratic Congressman Charles Wilson an ex-lumberjack from Texas. The trite thing about this is that the unifying factor between the wealthy republican businessman and the rural democratic lumberjack is through two very attractive women of Ukranian descent. The potentially destabilizing effect on the domestic affairs of a relatively large Caribbean Nation by what is effectively a rather unsophisticated relationship illustrates this vulnerability. The alliance between drug and gambling interests in the Dominican rebellion foreshadows the potential impact of an 'supra-national' problem the international drug interests. The fact is that these interests command

resources with which they have been able to corrupt or intimidate into submission the political systems of nations as large as Columbia and Panama. How much more vulnerable to their financial, political, and military power must the States of the Commonwealth Caribbean be?

The Drug interests in particular have designs on not only the territories for their activities but in particular as transit points and Air/Sea corridors. This further complicates the security problems of the region. As has been pointed out the naval vulnerability in the Caribbean is a demonstrated fact. Any attempts to control the flow of narcotics through the Commonwealth Caribbean without great emphasis on coordination will be prohibitively expensive to the nations as

<sup>23</sup>  
individuals. This is complicated by evidence that Cuba has actively assisted the drug lords in the transit of their commodity to markets in the US possibly in exchange for the assistance rendered by the Drug Lords to the various revolutionary movements in South

<sup>24</sup>  
America. This is in addition to the perceived longterm threat to the social stability of the US. These links in combination with the Bahamian incident and growing US restlessness with governments that are not doing enough to curb drugs, have potentially disastrous consequences for the economic and political security of the Region. The major Defense responsibility therefore is the control of the sea and air lanes of the Region.

## INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

In the present International climate and bearing in mind participation of nations of the region in major international political institutions such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations, the potential for extra-regional involvement in peacemaking or peacekeeping is great. Troops from Jamaica have participated under the auspices of the Commonwealth for example in the 'Post-Amin' Uganda. It was proposed by the US administration for example that Jamaican troops could form part of a peacekeeping force in the event the Falklands conflict had ground to a stalemate.

25 The potential for participation in peacekeeping forces in a destabilized Haiti remains as long as the island remains poor and the economy remains skewed, benefiting only a small upperclass. The potential for Commonwealth involvement in Southern Africa increases as the situation deteriorates. It has been privately reported for example that the Commonwealth Secretary General favors contingency planning for a Commonwealth peacekeeping force in South Africa.

26 It has also been reported that Zimbabwe has been making approaches to the Commonwealth with a view to securing Commonwealth assistance for jointly protecting Zimbabwe's economic lifeline through Mozambique, the Beira Corridor.

27

## YET ANOTHER DIMENSION TO THE THREAT.

The above scenarios have been developed against a

background that the present East West Power balance remains stable. That the Commonwealth Caribbean remains generally pro-western and democratic. And finally that the Global economy does not significantly alter the ability of the Western powers to retain their generally benign detachment from local Caribbean politics. Instead being prepared to take military action in the region in concert with local governments and not directly.

The violation of any of the above criteria could spell potential security disaster for the Commonwealth Caribbean. There is little probability that in addition to the more pressing global responsibilities the US could afford the Naval resources to secure the Caribbean Sea and the South Atlantic in the event the Soviets should use her navy with its prodigious submarine assets to threaten the North Atlantic and Pacific Sea Routes. Capable Surrogates would therefore have to be 'identified', 'recruited', and 'paid' to do the job. In the Latin American and South Atlantic Region this translates to almost everyone besides members of the Commonwealth Caribbean Region. These circumstances can also be expected to force the reduction of British and general European commitment to the region. The problem for the Commonwealth Caribbean is that the US traditionally identifies with the Latin Nations  
28 especially as 'The South Atlantic Regional Powers are developing military capabilities that complement

those of the United States and represent potential reinforcement that could free US forces for action in other areas in a <sup>29</sup> VARIETY of contingencies'. Bearing in mind that as indicated 'The Caribbean countries are able to contribute very little to regional defense, a responsibility which consequently falls to the United States'. These quotes were taken from Margaret Daly Hayes article on 'Security to the South: US interests in Latin America'. She also indicates that the present Latin Policy of 'Not automatic alignment' in the East West conflict is designed to exact a 'price' from the US for securing the 'Southern Flank' in US interest and that this 'price' includes US willingness to make them 'equal partners' and provide the kind of high technology now being supplied to Venezuela necessary to upgrade their capabilities to 'North Atlantic' standards. It is highly probable that the 'price' will also include the US turning a blind eye to Latin American pursuit of their territorial designs on the Commonwealth Caribbean. It is even conceivable that should the Commonwealth Caribbean political orientation be too far left of centre that the US could become an active antagonist in support of these Latin designs.

The Commonwealth Caribbean Defense dilemma therefore is; What organization, actions and trade-offs are required in order to ensure Regional Security now and in the conceivable future?

## END NOTES

## CHAPTER TWO

1. Butler S. United States Forces' Caribbean and the Caribbean Today Surface Warfare Sep 82
2. The principle of Uti-Possidehs juris of 1810 lays down the rule that the bounds of the Latin Republics are the frontiers of the Spanish pronnces for which they were substituted regardless of colonization.
3. Parry & Sherlock A short History of the West Indies p.52 & 61 (hereinafter called 'P&S').
4. 'P&S' p203.
5. Maingot: Essays on strategy and diplomacy No. 4.
6. 'P&S' chapters 5, 8, 10 & 13.
7. Whereas at one time emigration from the Commonwealth Caribbean was relatively free today it is far more 'selective'. Barriers to immigration in the developed nations restrict all but the more 'valuable' immigrants whose loss the region can ill-afford from a development point of view.
8. 'P&S' Chapter 18.
9. Mordecai. The Federal Negotiations. page 277.
10. Maingot: Essays on strategy and diplomacy No. 4. This covers in depth the incidents refferred to in this section.
11. Schoenhals & Melanson: Revolution and Intervention in Grenada part 1 chap 4. Downfall of the P.R.G.
12. Maingot: Essays on Stregy & Diplomacy No. 4 page 11.
13. Sewel Khaddafy Attempts to cast his shadow over the Caribbean. Miami Herald 6 Aug 1983 .
14. The North Koreans maintain embassies in the Caribbean (apart from the mission in Grenada) when they have no apparent identifiable cultural or economic ties in the Region.
15. Time Magazine. The Drug Thugs. 7 March 1988.
16. Border & Territorial Disputes pages 378, 381, 346
17. Crossette. Venezuela will seek negotiations. New York Times 19 May 88.
18. Student Treatise. A study of the Venezuela Guyana Border Dispute. Combined Arms Research Library USACGSC. page 6.

19. Border & Territorial Disputes page 346-350
20. Keegan: World Armies page 267, 271
21. Mittleman & Will. Jamaica Under Manley. Africa Today. 1st & 2nd Quarters 1987.
22. Birnbaum: Wallstreet Journal 2 Mar 88 page 1
23. Trainor: Coping with Drug Runners at Sea. page 85
24. Douglass & Sejna: International Narcotics trafficking The Soviet Connection and Sanchez D. Triple Threat to the Western Hemisphere
25. Hastings & Jenkins. Battle for the Falklands page 259
26. From conversation between the author and the High-commissioner of a large Commonwealth Nation to Jamaica in 1986.
27. From a conversation between the author and a senior Zimbabwean Army Officer in March 1988.
28. Daly Hayes. Security to the South: US Interests in Latin America. International Security, Summer 1980.
29. This authors emphasis.



### CHAPTER THREE

#### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Seven main areas were identified for research into this paper but there was very little scholarship on the Defense of the Commonwealth Caribbean until after the Grenada incident. Even then however, with a few notable exceptions the focus was not on defense from a Caribbean, but from a US or international perspective.

The Commonwealth Caribbean as indicated before is in a sense a misnomer because it applies to a group of states only loosely bound by tenuous cultural and political ties. It encompasses great racial diversity, while plodding steadily along to a greater racial homogeneity through intermarriage than most other places in the world. While the region is characterized by vast areas of ocean most of the islands tenuously reach out to each other over relatively easily navigable distances. The cultural, political, and economic dominance of Britain over the region has made the search for historical defense problems great, and for the most part skewed by the fact that Caribbean defense has historically been bound up in European wars. There have been no wars that have really been fought in this region without connection to the European arena and in reaction to events there. This was typically so of all the literature up to and including World War Two.

Extracting the Commonwealth Caribbean defense perspective from post World War Two literature was equally difficult because the problems of the Commonwealth Caribbean were dwarfed by, and submerged under, the happenings in the Latin world, as the United States established its political dominance over this hemisphere.

With the demise of the great powers of the nineteenth century, so declined the overt threat to these islands so many of which are carefully strewn on the edge of the strategic Caribbean Sea. As the twentieth century unfolded the remaining dominant maritime power in this hemisphere, the United States, espoused no overt territorial ambitions on states in the region. The Latin nations until relatively recently had no real capability to threaten anyone but their near neighbors. It therefore took careful search to find any definitive work on the military threat to the Commonwealth Caribbean. After overcoming the traditional orientation to Cuba and all the various iterations and graduations of left wing designs on the Commonwealth Caribbean it was a sobering surprise to re-discover that there remained a powerful, latent and very real threat to Commonwealth Caribbean security from the right leaning governments of Latin America. The change or growth in Latin American ambitions and capability demanded scrutiny of their territorial and political ambitions. The results were surprising.

The security of any country or region is

inextricably wrapped up in its people, their history, culture, aspirations and achievements. The question, as to what made up the definitive Commonwealth Caribbean character, if any, had to be answered. What shaped the region's national will? What is the politics of its people? How do they and their economy fit into global trends? What about the people gives them claim to an identity and therefore a group worthy of defense?

The contemporary history of this hemisphere is dominated by the colossus of the United States and at every turn of the way in researching the vulnerability of the Commonwealth Caribbean the US would necessarily feature. However, extracting from a scholarly perspective the US attitude to Commonwealth Caribbean security in any other orientation than toward Russia was like trying to clean toast crumbs from soft butter without wasting any butter. Research into the Monroe doctrine and its effects on US foreign policy for the region was the chief source of leads into this area and revealed the main dilemma that the Commonwealth Caribbean had to face. That was how do you assess the reliability of the US as a political ally bearing in mind her hemispherical responsibility? There was abundant material dealing with US policy in the Caribbean covering the Reagan years and belatedly, the Carter era. This material simply highlights the dilemma.

If not the US then "who do you call"? Britain "shut  
1  
out" of Grenada by her waning political influence still

exercises considerable influence in the region as there are still some colonies (See ANNEX A) and Belize (although independent) still under British protection. Britain however exercises her greatest influence on the region by virtue of the indelible cultural stamp which characterizes every area to which the British empire stretched. That remnant of the empire embodied in the Commonwealth of Nations is still a rather pervasive international institution through which Imperial Britain still exerts considerable influence. The Commonwealth like a slumbering giant awakens when there is trouble and Grenada was trouble. Stirred by events in Grenada the Commonwealth commissioned a study into the vulnerability of small states the results of which were published and have already been<sup>2</sup> felt. How strong, how tenacious, how influential is the Commonwealth? and what relationship is there between the security of the Commonwealth Caribbean and the modern parent body itself? The Commonwealth role in international peace and stability was also worthy of research especially where it impinged on the Commonwealth Caribbean in terms of rendering assistance to, or seeking the assistance of the region.

World War Two reinforced the need for an international system of justice that was enforceable and a system of 'sorts' seems to have been established. The questions in this area raised by this thesis surround, the effectiveness of international law and its effect on the

region's security. Emanating from this are the corresponding questions as to which international institutions embody the formation, arbitration, and administration of international law. Most importantly however is, what are the limits of international law? How does this impinge on Commonwealth Caribbean security? The need for combined operations and the limitations on intervention, from a Caribbean combined operations perspective?

The fact of Commonwealth Caribbean fragmentation balanced against the obvious cultural and political bonds enjoyed by the region has always been a carrot for integration in the region. Starting with the now defunct West Indies federation, how successful have succeeding integration attempts been and what portents do they hold for the future? What scope is there for Commonwealth Caribbean defense in terms of requirements and forces from a historical perspective? What has been done in this area to date? These questions lead to the investigation of the colonial and modern military history of the region embodied in the West India Regiment, the Federation Army, the Regional Security System, the Belize Commonwealth Caribbean Security Guarantee and Current Regional Military cooperation.

Although the Commonwealth Caribbean is being dealt with as a whole, it really comprises five million people living in a plethora of mini and micro states scattered

over a radius of nearly 1500 miles. Each nation has its own concept of defense and has evolved its own type of security force. This combined with the Grenada lesson, that the individual states of the region have no credible defense force, dictates combined operations as a foundational military principle. The problems of combined operations therefore needed to be examined.

Operation Urgent Fury which created such a huge international flurry, had volumes written about it, covering every aspect except one, the Commonwealth Caribbean contribution. Most of the early scholarly attention focused on the legitimacy and other political aspects of the Rescue. Later great attention was paid to investigating the military performance of the US by a still piqued journalistic community. Only one short article could be found dealing with the combined aspects of the operation and the Commonwealth Caribbean contribution to it.

Of the many works listed in the Bibliography there were some that were of enormous value in the different areas. Some were not even quoted directly but provided invaluable assistance in charting a course for this thesis.

From a historical point of view and taking the development of the region as a whole Parry and Sherlocks' 'Brief History of the West Indies' and Mordecai's 'Federal Negotiations' were of enormous value. Axline's 'Caribbean Integration' supported and focused these works in modern

times.

The contemporary politics of the region has been thoroughly covered in numerous periodical articles but Anthony Maingot's various papers have been critical to the completion of the analysis from a regional security perspective.

The security needs of the region became the subject of journalistic commentary mostly after Grenada. Here the most valuable work however was the report of the Commonwealth study group on the 'Vulnerability of Small States'. Anthony Maingot's article on the regional security perspective was also instructive.

The Grenada intervention at the political level was very well covered by Dunn and Watson who compiled 'American Intervention in Grenada' and Schoenhals and Melanson's 'Revolution and Intervention in Grenada', which gave the 'inside' and 'outside' views of the Revolution and Rescue. Spector's 'US Marines in Grenada', Anderson's 'Operation Urgent Fury' and Cragg's 'The US Army in Grenada' provided the operational side of the Urgent Fury story.

Hixson and Coolings 'Combined Operations in Peace and War' gave very valuable insights to the problems of the combined operations and a good overview of the framework of combined operations.

The most valuable insights were however the telephone and face to face interviews done with those individuals who were accessible and involved in

Commonwealth Caribbean defense such as COL R. K. Barnes,  
Commander Caribbean Peacekeeping Force for Operation Urgent  
Fury, COL S. Butler lately political military advisor  
Commander US Forces Caribbean and the Hon Errol Anderson,  
Minister of National Security Jamaica.



## ENDNOTES

## CHAPTER THREE

1. Britains Grenada Shut-Out. the Economist 10 March 1984.
2. Commonwealth Heads of Government. The New Delhi Communique November 1983. pages 2 and 8.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### METHODOLOGY

In order to answer the question posed by the thesis "What are the problems for the Commonwealth Caribbean involved in the successful integration of their small forces with each other and with large forces in multinational combined operations and how can these be overcome?" one immediately faces the dilemma of 'scope' for as has been pointed out the Commonwealth Caribbean has been so blissfully naive about its approach to the political and military requirements of defense that practically nothing has been done about it. Grenada, for the first time in modern conscience, forced, Caribbean governments to face the full reality and possible extent of their mutual interdependence for the sake of their own security. It should have brought home the realization that a measure of political independence may have to be sacrificed to regional integration for the sake of national viability. On the other hand Grenada should have caused military establishments throughout the region to shake off their collective internal security myopia and recognize the wider scope of their professional responsibility. It should have caused them to realize that the shooting war that may claim the lives of their soldiers could originate in more than the periodic flurry of political passion or the unrestrainable greed of some armed, unemployed political gunman. It could instead be rooted in a

carefully planned, professionally executed insurgency campaign, 'drugcartel' takeover, or a cross border invasion from a neighboring Latin American state. It should have shown up as delusion that the usual armor of eloquent political rhetoric and resplendent ceremonial posturing can be easily penetrated by the ominous, lingering thump of crew served weaponry and the silent soaking of warm blood into the Commonwealth Caribbean soil. Grenada has exposed the need for an approach to defense that is Caribbean-wide in reach, politically regional in origin and comprehensively ensconced strategically, operationally and organizationally.

This thesis can only 'aspire' to marginally cover this entire scope and will merely serve as the start point to the interested party in studying for, or planning for the execution of the final goals if indeed the lessons above have been learned. The research methodology was therefore designed to be flexible in its approach to the topic and essentially provide a framework on which research results and, more importantly, assessments could be hung.

In order to ensure a certain discipline and recognizable order to the report a series of matrices were developed with opposing axes representing on the one hand the areas, principles or levels of consideration, on another the aspects the problem and the third axis in the two main cases were bases on which any military approaches or campaign is built. These matrices largely owe their

roots to the National Strategic Appraisal flowchart which in itself comprises the national elements of power and the US Army Command and General Staff College strategic Analysis Model. (See ANNEX E)

There is an analytical matrix a supporting matrix and a recommendation matrix. The Analytical matrix (as per Figure One) comprises the aspects of command and control, combat forces, combat support requirements, combat sustainment requirements compared to the political level the strategic level and the operational/tactical level. The three bases are information, planning, and execution. The nodepoints of this matrix have been labeled major or minor depending on the perceived importance of the locus isolated by the node. The emphasis of the discussion in chapter 5 will be greater for major nodes and correspondingly less for minor nodes.

ANALYTICAL MATRIX

		information	planning	execution	
					BASES
COMMAND & CONTROL	MAJOR	MAJOR	minor	MAJOR	
COMBAT FORCES	minor	minor	MAJOR	MAJOR	
COMBAT SUPPORT	minor	minor	minor	MAJOR	
SUSTAINMENT	minor	MAJOR	MAJOR	MAJOR	
	POLITICAL	STRATEGIC	DOCTRINAL ORGANISATIONAL LEVELS	OPERATIONAL TACTICAL	ASPECTS

(Figure One)

In respect of the aspect of command control at the political, strategic and operational tactical levels the nodes are treated as major nodes requiring careful analysis. At the doctrinal level it is treated as a minor node because there is very little profit from analyzing this in depth and it need only be dealt with in the commentary form that, "coordination of doctrinal development is essential." This however, does not reduce its importance in the overall structure of the thesis, just the analytical effort devoted to it.

Combat forces at the political and strategic levels are treated as minor nodes. The intent is to treat this aspect more carefully at the doctrinal and operational/tactical levels, and since military structures tend to be modular and graduated in nature then, directly extrapolating the ideas will make the analysis largely applicable at the higher levels.

Combat support requirements because of their natural evolution from other combat force aspects receives major treatment at only the operational/tactical level. At this level also major treatment is given in a restricted fashion to the subdivided areas of training and equipment.

Sustainment is treated as major at all levels except the political level and even here requires almost major treatment. It is an important aspect.

The supporting matrix (Figure 2) is a means of clarifying the doctrine and operations/tactical levels of

the foregoing matrix it compares training, employment deployment and

SUPPORTING MATRIX

	DOCTRINE	ORGANIZATION	PERSONNEL	EQUIPMENT
TRAINING	XXX		XXX	
EMPLOYMENT	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX
DEPLOYMENT	XXX		XXX	XXX
SUSTAINMENT	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX

(Figure two)

sustainment against, doctrine organization, personnel and equipment. This matrix does not provide subjects for analytical development from its nodes but provides a check and comparison to ensure that all areas of these important levels are covered. In this respect the nodes for employment in the opposing areas doctrine organization, personnel and equipment must be covered in the analysis. For deployment, organization is not critical for analysis now. For sustainment all the areas must be covered. On the other hand training equipment and training organization are not deemed critical for the analysis.

The final main matrix is the recommendation matrix (See Figure 3) and this matrix drives chapter 6. This matrix on one hand comprises the three levels of political supervision, military command and military forces against doctrine, organization, equipment, manning and training. The third axis is again information, planning and execution.

# RECOMMENDATION MATRIX.

	information	planning	execution	BASES		
POLITICAL	principles	principles	principles	principles	METHODS	L
SUPERVISION	principles	principles	principles	METHODS	METHODS	E
MILITARY	principles	principles	METHODS	METHODS	METHODS	V
COMMAND						E
MILITARY						S
FORCES						
	DOCTRINE	ORGANIZA- TION	MANNING	TRAINING	EQUIPMENT	
	ASPECTS					

(Figure 3)

Political supervision is deemed to encompass first, the assignment of the mission in a general sense in response to the general strategic needs, and in a particular sense in response to a specific situation. It also includes the provision of reserves in response to the needs of the assigned mission and the monitoring of the application of those resources. It does not include the operational or tactical employment of the military forces.

Military command has to do with the implementation of the mission through the development and training of the force and the operational and tactical employment of the force.

Military forces involves the military structure required to face the perceived threat and measures to deal with the problems identified with its development, maintenance and employment.

The treatment of these nodes will be as for the analytical matrix on two levels of detail dependent on the

perceived competence of this paper. These two levels are referred to as 'principles' and 'methods'. Principles are tentative suggestions of approaches to a solution of a perceived problem area or possible solution or solutions that might be adequate. Methods on the other hand are firmer more authoritative recommendations as to the steps required to effect the requisite solution.

In respect of political supervision this paper can only claim competence to go beyond 'principle' in the areas of equipment and manning. At the level of military command however training and organization can be added to methods, and when it comes to military forces recommendations of development of doctrine, organization, equipment, manning and training will be treated from a methodological point of view.

It should be noted however that the recommendation matrix in particular and this paper in general are being developed as minutely as this under the assumption that the arguments presented on the need for Commonwealth Caribbean defense cooperation have been accepted and the full political will of the participants can be marshalled.

Using the matrices above, four special situations will be applied in order to comprehensively extract the problems that lay in the way of development of an appropriate defense structure.

The first study will be of operation Urgent Fury, in particular the part played by the Commonwealth Caribbean.



Conclusions will be drawn from open source material not in respect of detail but rather principle. This will avoid the tangle of journalistic interpretations of specific situations by stepping back from any one situation, viewing the many and applying the proverb "where there is smoke there 'aught' to be fire" followed by the truism that even if this were not entirely true "it does no harm to call up the fire truck anyway."

The second case that will be applied to the analytical matrix is the present Caribbean defense posture to include the component military forces their mission, organization equipment and standards of training and general capability (as per ANNEX C). Present cooperative security arrangements and trends will also be discussed against this matrix.

The above will be followed by analysis of a hypothetical situation within the region based on an escalation of the Belize/Guatemala border dispute necessitating the political decision to assist. The strategic implementation of the assistance and the operational execution of a campaign involving the Commonwealth Caribbean with each other and Great Britain, will therefore be examined.

Finally reference will be made to the possible extraregional requirement of the Caribbean forces to participate in peace-keeping in cooperation with forces from throughout the Commonwealth. The impacts and demands

of such a contribution, will be aluded to.

The problems isolated from these scenarios will then by synthesized and pooled and solutions proposed as per the recommendation matrix. Throughout the analysis and recommendations the thesis will be driven by the requirements of the strategic analysis flow chart, The principles of Interoperability and the requirements of Force Development and integration.

As mentioned this thesis and the analysis presented is strongly driven by the CGSC Strategic Analysis Model at Annex E and the National Elements of Power. In examining the National Elements of Power it can be argued that the element of national will is far more complex than meets the eye. Although it does generally comprise sociological factors and psychological factors the closer to home or the more nationally subjective a crisis becomes can cause national will to swing across the spectrum of commitment from ambivalent to passionate. This has led to a division of the element of national will in this thesis into two component parts a current will and a cultural will. The current will is molded on the one hand by a nation's immediate response to a crisis or situation that is sufficiently detached form every day life to be assessed objectively and in the light of the immediate political and strategic atmosphere surrounding the situation. The lead is taken on a pragmatic basis by the ruling administration. This will molds support for the

administration in backing the Afghan rebels against the Soviet invasion as an example. On the other hand the current national will initially supported President Carter in his idealistic approach to Latin American politics in the aftermath of the Republican Nixon scandals. This changed as the political climate changed and it is this will that any ruling administration seeks to mold to its own purpose. The deeper and less maleable componenet is cultural will and has is roots in the sum total of a nation's historical cultural character and the racial and cultural roots from which it was grown. It was this will that drew the United States inexorably from a stance of commercial detachment to total commitment to European defense in World War One and to a lesser extent in World War Two. Again current will expressed in the Monroe Doctrine caused a stand-off between Britain and the US in the matter of the border dispute between Britain and Venezuela over the then British Guyana. It was cultural will that lay at the root of the US position of overt nuetrality and clandestine support of Britain in the Falklands. It is on the basis of this outline argument that some of the conclusions as to the US political position vis a vis the Commonwealth Caribbean have been drawn.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### A SERIES OF SCENARIOS

#### OPERATION URGENT FURY

'On Saturday, 22 October 1983 at approximately 2130 hours I received a call from Up Park Camp and all the caller said was ...'Anderson report to camp for duty...'. So began the Grenada intervention code named "Urgent Fury" for the Adjutant of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, Capt V.H. Anderson of the Jamaica Defense Force.<sup>1</sup>

The Grenada Operation codenamed Urgent Fury, a joint US - Commonwealth Caribbean rescue of the population of Grenada, was founded against the background developed in Chapter One. It represented the military option to a complex, crisis-level political situation.

The decision to intervene in Grenada evolved simultaneously from the basic fact that a crisis of international proportions with regional, hemispherical and global qualities had developed. Events however were proceeding at a pace that could leave the main actors with fewer and fewer options, and if left too long possibly none. Political requirement therefore, was the basic motivating factor on the side of both the US and Commonwealth Caribbean Governments as they sought to contain the Soviet/Cuban political penetration of the Caribbean. The more idealistic motive of rescuing a hapless Grenadan population was secondary. The political feasibility of the intervention was further facilitated by

the conservative nature of the US and Commonwealth Caribbean Governments of the time and the strong anticommunist stand of Jamaica, Barbados and the OECS States.

The decision to intervene in Grenada was made necessary by the traditional inconsistency and ambivalence that has attended US Caribbean policy for so long. That the situation in Grenada was of concern to the Reagan administration was obvious to the world. It has subsequently become more obvious that this concern was largely rhetorical and demonstrative in that the "gee whiz" photographs of Point Salines Airport so prominently displayed for National consumption on TV on March 23, 1983 by the President and the Amber and the Ambergines (hypothetical Grenada) exercise of 1983 was never translated into effective policy prior to the requirement to intervene. As Francis McNeal, lately a senior deputy in the Department of State put it "The Reagan Administration saw the Grenada situation as ...I'll huff and puff and blow your Marxist house down." There is no doubt that the entrenching of another overtly communist regime in the Caribbean was an abhorrent and real prospect to the US and until the internal convulsions tore the PRG apart there was no pretext for the equally abhorrent but necessary military intervention. With the establishment of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) as the Grenadan Government, the situation in Grenada became intolerable to the US and the

NCA eventually tasked the Defense establishment with the mission to restore <sup>2</sup> democratic Government to Grenada by removing the RMC from power and dismantling the Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA)

Because of the national will element of National power and the immediate susceptibility of the executive of the US government to the whims of public opinion the mission as stated had to be packaged with an aspect calculated to ensure that public opinion could be marshalled. The existence of the campus of the offshore St. Georges University Medical School and its sizeable population of 700 American students was known and their security in the aftermath of Iran, was in itself a mountainous justification. This initially had led to the diversion of the Task Force transporting the 22 MAU enroute to Beirut for Peacekeeping tasks. However this requirement to protect American lives formed a convenient public opinion "totem pole" for upgrading the operation from that of an MAU/SOF sized non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) to a fully fledged airborne/amphibious invasion aimed at fulfilling the larger political goals.

Simultaneously political developments among Commonwealth Caribbean Governments were proceeding along similar lines. Since 1982 there had been a Memorandum of Understanding binding the OECS states with Barbados termed the Regional Security System (RSS) which committed each <sup>3</sup> member to the others for mutual security. This system

suddenly found that its largely police based special service units were far outstripped by the pace, magnitude and strategic nature of the Grenada crisis. Although it is reported that The Hon Tom Adams considered the use of a BDF commando company in an attempted rescue of Prime Minister Bishop before he was executed.<sup>4</sup> This plan naturally came to naught. Consultations among members of the OECS (excepting Grenada) intensified as did consultation between these members and CARICOM in order to achieve the consensus required for strong action. These efforts proved fruitless and members of the RSS along with Jamaica decided to approach the Reagan Administration for assistance. There is no record that a similar approach was made to the UK government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and it is unlikely that Britain would have acted, the British Government would remember the February 1967 paratrooper invasion of Anguilla when this tiny island attempted a unilateral declaration of independence.<sup>5</sup> Then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was widely ridiculed for this intervention. This formal approach to the US put the final seal of approval on the Reagan administration's pre-disposition to take military action for the US generally must have its use of force "legitimised" in the eyes of the American public.

A very notable factor in the coalescing of political resolve to intervene militarily focuses on the group of Commonwealth Caribbean Nations that participated. As

indicated in Chapter One the defense cooperation aspect of the OECS pact did not include Barbados or Jamaica, although the Barbados sponsored RSS did. However, the Prime Ministers of Barbados, The Hon Tom Adams, Jamaica, The Hon Edward Seaga and Dominica, The Hon Eugenia Charles were the 'front men' and seemed to be the driving forces behind the intervention. The other participants The Hon Vere Bird of Antigua and Barbuda, the Hon John Compton of St. Lucia reportedly displayed somewhat less enthusiasm for any concurrent intervention with the United States although they favored US intervention. This reported reluctance culminated when the Hon James Mitchell of St. Vincent and the Grenadines refused to allow the Vincentian contingent to participate in the original operations, releasing them to join the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force some four days later when the 'Battle had been won', and the outcome assured.

The final legitimizing requirement needed to come from the Grenadan side. It is reported that Her Majesty's representative in Grenada, Governor General Sir Paul Scoon was spoken to on 22 Oct 83 by US Envoys and the Deputy<sup>6</sup> British High Commissioner to Barbados. There is much controversy concerning the request from Sir Paul to the OECS and the US to intervene militarily on behalf of the people of Grenada. The controversy rages around the timing of Sir Pauls request, was it before or after the fact? Especially as the written confirmation was



definitely after the fact. The controversy has been fueled by things the Governor General is alleged to have said subsequent to the operation.<sup>7</sup>

In fact the political legality of the operation was seriously challenged by almost every authoritative institution worldwide and the foreseen potential for this could have probably had a direct influence on the political commitment of the main actors.<sup>8</sup>

The alarmed reaction of much of the International Community, the reluctance of some of the main actors, the hesitant way that the US stumbled into Urgent Fury could all be attributed to the fact that International Law is not necessarily an "international reference point" as well as the self-serving fear of the dominant powers by lesser ones.<sup>9</sup> The reaction completely loses sight of the unchallengeable moral rightness of the "rescue" from the point of view of the Grenadan people for whose benefit the government of Grenada must be presumed to exist. It is from this point of view that the strength and commitment of the chief executives of the United States, the OECS States (particularly Dominica), Barbados and Jamaica should be commended. The cheers of the populace of Grenada on the 27 October 1983 attest to this.

Because the Operation evolved in a rather disjointed fashion at the political level there were a number of serious 'disconnects' at the strategic level. These disconnects' included the planning of the operations, the

strategic deployment and timing of the deployment, and the commitment of the troops to Urgent Fury.

When the PRG self-destructed it kicked into motion the political train described above. A constantly changing political aim caused Operation Urgent Fury to have superimposed upon it a series of strategic expansions that caused planning for and execution of the Operation to be confusing.

The first stated political aim was the safe, rapid and if necessary forceful extraction of US citizens from Grenada.<sup>10</sup> Particular emphasis was to be placed on the students of the St. Georges Medical School. At all costs a repetition of the Iran hostage crisis was to be avoided. Assurances by the RMC that the students would not be molested were, in the uncertain atmosphere 'taken with a grain of salt.'

USFORCARIB in Key West Florida had been created as a sub-unified command of LANTCOM.<sup>11</sup> It has responsibility for the entire Caribbean area excluding Central America which is under SOUTHCOM. Established with only notional forces USFORCARIB had a skeletal contingency plan for Grenada and should have become operational as Joint Task Force 140, if the need arose.<sup>12</sup>

As the Grenada situation unfolded speed and expedience caused CINCLANT on 20 October to divert the amphibious Task Force en-route to the Mediterranean to a station 500 miles northeast of Grenada.<sup>13</sup> The staff of the embarked 22d

Marine Amphibious Unit started initial planning for the operation using a 1936 British Maritime chart of Grenada and the personal knowledge of two of the members of the Task Force Staff, one of whom had done a War College paper involving a hypothetical landing on the island of Grenada, and the other, an amateur sailor, had recently sailed Caribbean waters to include Grenada while on leave. The mission analysis yielded tasks to seize Point Salines Airfield and the overlooking high ground, and secure an evacuation zone in the vicinity of Grand Anse Beach. They also contemplated seizing the Pearls Airfield to the north of the island. At this time their knowledge of the enemy situation was practically nonexistent.

On 23 October the political developments described caused the operation to be changed and the Amphibious Task Force was informed that Joint Task Force 120 had been formed under Commander Second fleet to include a Carrier Battle Group, elements of the Army Rangers and necessary troops of the 82nd Airborne Division. (The latter two Army units would secure points on the southern portion of the island including Points Salines Airport and St. Georges. The Marines were to seize Pearls Airport and the port of Grenville). The operations would be supported by USAF elements.

In the meantime USFORCARIB/JTF 140 had been largely excluded from the operation and only elements of their contingency plan were utilized. The concurrent political

developments on the Commonwealth Caribbean side yielded the decision on 21 October to request US assistance and intervention in Grenada. The participation of the OECS States (excluding Grenada) but including the non-OECS<sup>14</sup> Jamaica and Barbados was to be as each was able. The agreement hammered out with Ambassador Bish was apparently that the US would accomplish the liberation and the Commonwealth Caribbean would provide the post-invasion peacekeeping force.

The decisions as to the composition of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF), the strategic deployment of it and the timing of the commitment of the Force appeared to have simply happened. Jamaica with the largest regular defense force, committed to provide a Ranger Company<sup>15</sup> Group and a headquarters and staff for the CPF. Barbados would provide a commando platoon. The other participants generally provided para-military units of 15 to 20 men each. These were in fact mostly riot policemen or the equivalent.

Command of the CPF having been established under COL R.K. Barnes of the Jamaica Defense Force, the task of staging these troops to Barbados commended. The Headquarters of the Barbados Defense Force by virtue of its resources and location and previous responsibility as coordinating headquarters of the RSS automatically assumed coordinative responsibility for the strategic aspects of the CPF participation, while Headquarters CPF prepared to

assume operational and tactical command. The assembly of the troops in Barbados for all the participants but Jamaica went generally smoothly and by 24 October all these troops had been assembled in Bridgetown Barbados. Only the advance party of the CPF headquarters comprising the Commander CPF and the Company Group Commander, Major S.E. Sanders, also of the Jamaica Defense Force, were at this time in Bridgetown.

In the meantime the Jamaica Defense Force had identified and selected a Ranger Company from the Second Battalion Jamaica Regiment recently returned from its annual field exercises in Jamaica's inhospitable Cockpit country. This company formed the core of the company group which included sections (squads) of transport, signals, medical, military police, engineers, and supply. There were also teams from Maintenance, Bomb Disposal and Military Intelligence. A coastguard element was subsequently included. The main body comprised approximately 150 soldiers of all ranks. Getting the troops to Barbados was the next problem. At first attempts were made to charter an Air Jamaica A300 Airbus and crewing it as far as possible with Jamaica Defense Force Reserve pilots employed with the Airline. This would accomplish the movement in one lift. Eventually the airline provided a Boeing 727 aircraft. This had to be supplemented by a US Navy Reserve Boeing 727. The JDF had no plans for that level of strategic deployment at such short notice.

While the JDF was 'getting there' the Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force, Brigadier R.E. Lewis, the defacto 'Supreme Commander' on the Commonwealth Caribbean side patiently proceeded to call each Commonwealth Caribbean Chief executive in order to secure authority to commit the Caribbean troops to Grenada with the 82nd Airborne and therefore avoid any potential for the argument that the CPF was a mere cover for US aggressive action and not a joint partner at the political and strategic levels. The process reportedly required more than one round of calls in some instances in order to secure the necessary authority, and as previously indicated the Vincentian contingent was not subsequently committed until 28 October.

By the time of the final assembly of the CPF in Barbados 0900 hrs 25 October Urgent Fury was tactically underway.

The CPF assembled in Bridgetown with their combat dress, personal weapons, all the ammunition that could be packed into the cargo holds of the two 727 aircraft and no armament heavier than the 81mm mortars of the JDF. There were no vehicles, as the intent was to 'beg, borrow, or steal' (capture from the enemy) repair and press into service whatever would be found in Grenada. Any additional needs would be supplied from Jamaica subsequently or by the US forces. It was only at this time that the Headquarters of the CPF first received a liaison officer from the 82nd

Airborne, the CPF did not reciprocate. In fact up until now neither the commander of the CPF or the staff of the CPF had received a briefing from Joint Task Force 120 HQ. The mission that was assumed was that as the 82nd advanced, the CPF would secure the rear areas and mop up PRA<sup>14</sup> prisoners. The marrying up that took place between the 82nd (Airborne) and the CPF consisted of the allocation of five C130s for their move into the operational area and the<sup>16</sup> attachment of the liaison officer.

The Concept of Operations developed by the Commander JTF 120 had to be designed to face a very uncertain enemy situation, with the greatest uncertainties focusing on the ground and in the air. The uncertainties were magnified by greater uncertainty as to what would happen at the political level, articulated by the question "How committed was Moscow (Havana) to the Breshnev Doctrine?" It raised the corresponding strategic and operational questions; how tenacious would the Cuban/Grenadan Force be on the ground? What interference would be expected from the Cuban Air Force in the air? Certainly the sea could not be discounted because of Cuba's (but more importantly, Russia's) known submarine warfare capability. Cuba's Migs (Cuban or Russian flown) could with Soviet strategic assistance influence the battle on the ground. How good were the Cuban troops on the ground? What would be their orders? The questions abounded, unfortunately the answers did not and wherever there were answers they were to

varying degrees in error. To further complicate matters this operation in the wake of the Iran hostage crisis, and the Beirut bombing was very sensitive to public opinion. Swift economical victory was essential to its success, it had to be shown to the world to be a victory emphasizing the legitimate appropriate use of force for an unchallengably correct purpose. Purpose in this instance including rescue of the American medical students in order to maintain US public support and in the bigger picture rescue of the people of Grenada in order to maintain international support, or at worst ward off severe international criticism.

Translated into an operation this required overwhelming combat forces on land, at sea, and in the air, careful joint and combined operation execution, incisive therefore collateral-damage-limiting combat and combat support, and highly coordinated deep and close operations (which may seem ridiculous in a land operational environment 18 miles by 8 miles but from a objective and terrain point of view was not).

The main objectives of the operations centered on the safe rapid extraction of the 700 US students from Grenada, the rescue of the Governor General, securing those vital points from which the PRA and Cuban troops gained their tactical center of gravity, and from which they could be supported or could marshall strategic and operational support and coordination. The majority of these targets



were concentrated in the southern third of the island. As for the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force the operation was envisaged to be no more than a one day operation and consequently the emphasis on sustainment was minimized.

The operation, based on estimates of potential enemy strength in particular the unknown, dictated a curious array of power. AWACs and F15 fighters from the USAF were deployed to eliminate the possibility of interference from the Cuban and Soviet Air forces. The 10 ship task force centered on the Attack Carrier USS Independence and the Marine Amphibious Unit which had attack helicopters, and both amphibious and heavy mechanized assets. There were also special operations forces for reconnaissance and vital point (person) security such as the Governor General and the Radio Station. Rapidly deploying forces such as the Army Rangers and 82nd Airborne were used for the sheer numbers and individual fire power that might become necessary to physically sweep and control the island in the event that PRA/Cuban troops decided to withdraw to an insurgency modus operandus. Finally the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force would lend legitimacy through its unchallengeably regional composition and provide less of a 'US military occupation' flavor to post-intervention peacekeeping duties. The force structure for Urgent Fury had all the ingredients for the instant success for which it was designed, and hindsight dictates that it had every reason to be an unqualified success. Why then wasn't it?

Why did it take 3 days for the 82nd Airborne to advance 5kms?

It is at this point that the most glaring failure of the entire Grenada situation becomes most obvious. The failure of information. The failure pre-existed Urgent Fury at all levels and was perpetuated throughout Urgent Fury by all levels. It would appear that with all the Reaganite huffing and puffing over Grenada, there was little detailed concern for what was actually happening in Grenada.<sup>8</sup> There was no clear picture of the details of what was Grenada, no details of the populations' attitude, no details of the New Jewel movement, no details of the East Block involvement.<sup>18</sup> The US government simply saw Grenada as a 'Red Haze on the far Caribbean horizon'. The hostility of the Administration was therefore rooted in this vague political reality. The unfortunate consequence of this was that when Bishop's Revolution committed suicide the State Department was not poised to take advantage of the opportunity. It was not until a few days before the operation that the CIA proceeded to commit humint resources to the island. The Defense Department very tardily on the 24 October also attempted to infiltrate a team to the island during the process of which 4 men died by drowning. It is amazing that with the undoubted strategic importance of Grenada (as it sits astride half the Gulf Ports sea routes with a distance from the US that renders it far more defensible than Cuba) that far greater intelligence

gathering effort was not devoted to it by the State Department and the CIA. It is even more amazing that as the President's rhetorical assault on Grenada increased and the Administration's alarm at the strategic potential of the new airport skyrocketed that greater efforts were not devoted to establishing humint resources and in fact tapping those already in place, such as western nationals and western sympathizers who, contrary to the knowledge of the Administration, were now fully disillusioned with a revolution they had never really supported. What is criminal and unconscionable is the fact that the very expensive highly capable Defense Mapping Agency was not tasked until 28 October to produce the tactical maps of the island that were necessary for successful prosecution of the operations.<sup>12</sup> The troops eventually went in to<sup>19</sup> battle with tourist maps of the island.

From the point of view of the principles of combined operations, to the best of my knowledge, the seriousness of the lack of intelligence on the island remained unknown to the Commonwealth Caribbean Governments and military authorities, and consequently another valuable resource went begging. The Jamaica Defense Force, for example, had a serving Lt Col, the Battalion Commander of that unit from which the Ranger Company was drawn, who was a native Grenadan and he had recently spent a year on leave in Grenada during the reign of the Bishop regime. More importantly he was thoroughly familiar with the operational

area and the populace, particularly that segment of the population most antagonistic to the souring revolution, the Church.<sup>20</sup> He was not originally committed as part of the operation because the Chief of Staff of the Jamaica Defense Force decided not to put him in a position where he might have to conduct combat operations against his own people. This decision would certainly have been reconsidered had the intelligence vacuum been known to the Jamaica Defense Force. It might have prevented the air strike on the mental hospital or made more remote the near miss on the Venezuelan embassy at Fort Adolphus.<sup>21</sup>

Another source that went, at best inexcusably and at worst criminally begging was the failure of the State Department to utilize the resources of the St. Georges University Medical School.<sup>19</sup> This despite repeated attempts (for obvious reasons) of the school administration to coordinate with the Administration on the matter of the safety of the students. As it turned out the failure had the unfortunate consequence that the operational units were not even aware of the existence of the locations of the students. This put at risk the entire operation politically and was a gross disservice to the Department of Defense. The overworked excuse of Operational Security in this instance cannot be supported in view of severity of the intelligence vacuum and throws into grave doubt the competence of the persons responsible for supplying the administration with information. They simply seemed

unaware of the huge gaps in the Grenada information pool.

There was no regional intelligence capability on the Commonwealth Caribbean side. Intelligence capability in their case was limited solely to national, internally focused military and criminal investigation systems. The late attempts at intelligence gathering can safely be said to have been "too few, too late" the troops went into battle blind.

13

The initial assault plan in the north of Grenada envisaged 22nd MAU assaulting and taking Pearls Airport and Grenville with a company for each objective, in a combined air and surface assault. This would give the Commander maximum flexibility in the assault with sufficient direct support weapons on the ground (M60 tanks) and in the air (Cobra Attack Helicopters) to deal with any potential opposition. The inter-unit boundary between the MAU and the 82nd Airborne lay just south of Grenville and extended in an irregular fashion across the island to just north of Gan Mal Bay as per ANNEX B. As it turned out the Marines had to abandon the amphibious landing and go over to a purely air assault which suffered from lack of detailed information on the LZs and the tactical situation on the ground, but they were able to secure their objectives in a timely manner. In the case of the Marines the lack of information was replaced by bold assessments of the possible enemy situations. This made risks such as the assault of Grenville using as an LZ a walled soccer field

(a potential enemy killing ground) viable risks. By 0800 hrs on the 27th October the Marines had fully secured their objectives.

In contrast to this the assault on the southern portion of the island was not proceeding nearly as well. In fact it was a rather ignominious debacle where an overwhelming preponderance of troops was held up by a relatively small number of Cubans and Grenadans.

2

The initial plan envisaged the Army Rangers air assaulting onto Point Salines airfield, securing the Airfield and rescuing the students at the St. Georges Medical School's True Blue Campus located at the southern tip of the Point Salines runway. Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division along with the two hundred plus strong Caribbean Peacekeeping Force would then airland and attack primarily on northerly and eastern axes to seize the capital St. Georges, rescue the Governor General (who would by then have been secured by an SOF team) and capture Calvigny Barracks, a Cuban/PRA stronghold.

The Cuban defense plan for Grenada had not envisaged the Marine component of the assault but had correctly assessed the air assault on the southern half of the island. The defenses were therefore largely disposed with this orientation and was not prepared for the Marine pincer in the north. In fact, some of the PRA commanders later testified that this led to an early decision to advise the troops to opt for civilian guise instead of pursuing the

defense of the revolution.

Without prior air defense suppression two Ranger Battalions were parachuted into Point Salines into the intense antiaircraft fire of defenses prepared for just such a tactic. After the lead aircraft had been turned back by the intensity of the fire, following aircraft were able to go in under the cover of the AC130 gunships and perform the drop. With some difficulty including the conversion of a bulldozer into an armored vehicle the Rangers were able to secure and clear the airfield. However it would have been a different story had the AA guns been better sited or had the PRA been equipped with SA7 Grail Shoulder fired missiles. Unknown to the 82nd Airborne, resistance had largely crumbled but because of the disruption of communication not all the Cuban/PRA units had been informed and probably emboldened by the ease with which they could hold up the advance of the 82nd stood their ground. The 82nd, deprived of the massive fire support which they have been trained to expect, without the tactical maps which were required for directing the most rudimentary of fighter ground attack, hampered by a lack of knowledge as to who the enemy was supposed to be and where he was disposed, 'went to ground'. On the night of the 25th the CPF was called on to guard the forward left sector of Point Salines with a platoon, in the unlikely event that the armored element of the PRA should launch a counterattack on that flank. In the meantime, the 82nd

continued to complete deployment of troops of its 2nd Brigade. By the evening of 26 October their advance was bogged down for lack of intelligence, poor morale and lack of boldness, bogged down for lack of leadership.<sup>23</sup>

In the meantime, the vital requirements for the rapid prosecution of the mission remained unfulfilled. The Governor General defended by the SOF team was still besieged by elements of the PRA, two locations holding American medical students remained outside of US/Caribbean control and St. Georges had not been captured. One of the hold ups was a piece of torturous terrain near Calvigny, including Calvigny barracks which was a Cuban/PRA strong point. It was a strong point mainly due to a lack of information about it. That there were enemy troops there that was sure, but how many and in what disposition, no one knew. the 82nd settled down to wait out the night until Air Force reconnaissance was received before the advance would be resumed.

Due to the urgency of the situation the commander of the CPF offered to send a Jamaican foot patrol into the area to establish detailed information about the enemy.<sup>14</sup> He proposed that his troops would have a better chance of successful infiltration of the enemy lines than their US "partners". It was also recognized that due to the mutual unfamiliarity between the US and Caribbean troops that the exit and entry of the patrol would have to be very carefully coordinated. A foot patrol was put



together and carefully briefed, in the meantime the CPF HQ proceeded to coordinate the outward and inward move of the patrol with every company location of the 82nd through which the patrol would have to pass, giving timings, composition, identification, and ascertaining passwords to ensure no confusion as to who was who in the patrol. The patrol departed as planned only to become bogged down among "friendly troops" by the time they were amongst the forward companies for the 82nd. It was apparent that the information on the patrol had not been passed down to the sentries or forward troops. As the risk of having the patrol "shot up" by friendlies increased an instruction was passed to the patrol commander to "go to ground" and hold in position until day light, when the possibility of being shot while passing back through the lines should have been considerably reduced.

As the 82nd/CPF thrust from the south 'bogged down' the Marines were reassigned objectives further south to include St. Georges and Grand Mal Bay and the boundary lines

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correspondingly redrawn. This boundary was again revised later on the 27th to include Ross Point. Their retasking had the priority of lifting the seige on the Governor General's residence. As the Marines planned for this new phase of the operation an attempt was made to bring the Cobra attack helicopters into coordination with a USAF Spectre gunship to support units of the 82nd. It was only after accidentally coming across an army frequency on

the radio that the flight of Cobras could prosecute the mission and then there was no cooperation with the Spectre Gunship. As the Cobras went in they could only be directed onto the target by the crudest of radio directions. The result was that the marines lost one helicopter to antiaircraft fire on the mission and another during the rescue of one of the pilots from the helicopter downed first. Although the target was more suitable for naval gunfire the risk of collateral damage precluded this. A similar situation applied to the use of the 105mm Artillery of the 82nd Airborne although these were used in the more remote areas. The marines had sensibly converted their artillery unit into infantry and used them as such for the duration.<sup>21</sup> The Marines also provided helicopter transport for the Army Rangers as they rescued the medical students from the Grand Anse campus. They also successfully rescued the Governor General and assaulted the Headquarters of the PRA at Fort Fredrick during which unopposed assault they captured a PRA senior officer. He indicated that the order had been given to the PRA to lay down their arms. They further indicated that the defenders had not anticipated the Marine assault north of St.<sup>22</sup> Georges. The Marines had enjoyed considerable success firstly because of the strategic surprise occasioned by their landings. They reinforced this with a rational assessment of what the enemy situation was. These supported their bold advances. This is the result of

competent leadership. Further examples of the competence of Marine leadership was that prior to the initial air assault all the Vietnam combat veterans were carefully parcelled out to each assault helicopter to 'steady' the uninitiated troops. In addition the troops were kept fully informed of the mission constantly being warned that they were liberators not conquerors, and passing on the latest boundary changes to the lowest competent echelons.

The contrast was the lack of information and motivation on the side of the 82nd Airborne. Already noted was the failure of the 82nd to pass information on the passage of the Jamaican patrol. The information on the boundary changes were also confined to the upper echelons of the 82nd to the extent that the advancing elements of the 82nd considered the Ross Point area which was already occupied by Marines a free fire zone! This factor introduced some hesitance in the prosecution of the operation by the  
25  
Marines henceforth.

The main problem facing the CPF now centered around the collection and processing of PRG/PRA/Cuban prisoners and the accompanying lack of administrative transportation. By late on the first day a dependable secure High Frequency (HF) rear link had been established with Headquarters Jamaica Defense Force and the CPF supporting elements turned their attention to acquiring and making serviceable captured Cuban and PRA vehicles. On Saturday 29 October the CPF began their more accustomed but less preferred role

of internal security operations, conducting snap raids, road blocks, foot and mobile urban patrols. All the while uncovering rather 'obscene' quantities of arms and ammunition that had been stockpiled by the PRG. <sup>26</sup> The main lack that showed up among the Commonwealth Caribbean Forces was their almost total lack of familiarity with one another which caused them to be employed during and after combat operations as island groups. In fact, they even lived together as island groupings. Unsuccessful efforts were made by Commander CPF to change this situation and enforce more intimate combined operations. Those attempts were later abandoned.

In summary the main lessons that have come out of Operation Urgent Fury are relevant at every level of joint and combined operations. Political rhetoric was not in itself a sufficient tool except when followed up all the way down the chain of command by unified and specified Commanders with contingency plans and inter-agency and inter-government groups effecting coordination. There appears not to have been but the most clumsy and hesitant follow-up of alarm over the developing situation in Grenada from an inter-government point of view. This hesitance apparently began when President Reagan suffered a serious rebuff, when he without understanding the character of West Indian politics, attempted and failed to create a crude power block against the Bishop Regime. He tried to align with the US those very Commonwealth Caribbean leaders who

later urged the US to intervene in the post Bishop Grenada but who on this occasion rejected his advance. With this rebuff the Reagan Administration apparently ceased active and overt coordinative attempts against Grenada prior to Urgent Fury. From the point of view of the US administration more sensitive coordination on a diplomatic level is required, taking into account the individual political personalities in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Being more responsive to the real pulse of the region is an indispensable precursor to successful political activity. This does not necessarily require the fielding of human resources but instead a more continuous and current capability to process information that is freely available in open source. The US political structure was not sufficiently dynamic or sensitive to respond to the developing situation in Grenada, where instead of being an active participant in the self-destruction of the PRG it was instead a surprised bystander.

The Commonwealth Caribbean had no mechanism exclusively for political consultation on defense matters outside of the OECS/RSS. Unfortunately continuing West Indian political fragmentation appears to preclude the establishment of one in the immediate future. This lack however, probably permitted the freedom of action necessary for the main actors to pursue the intervention without hindrance from partners who were not just reluctant but could be downright obstructive. In fact, it is felt in

some quarters that after the meeting of CARICOM heads of government at which CARICOM options in the wake of the demise of Maurice Bishop had been discussed, the intention of the six to proceed with the intervention with US assistance was telegraphed to the RMC by Guyanese authorities.<sup>27</sup>

On the Caribbean side political command seemed to cease when the decision to commit troops was made in a conference of the heads of government. There seemed to have been no one political figure with coordinative responsibility. Granted, the duration of the combat activity was sufficiently short to preclude any detailed need for a political figure and Sir Paul Scoon having been kept safe had sufficient in-house resources to further preclude the need for post-combat, political involvement on the Commonwealth Caribbean side.

In respect of command at joint task force level on the US side the peculiar evolution of the final political aim seemed to have kept JTF 140 or USFORCARIB out of the picture as events and developments overtook it, the operation evolving as it did from a Marine/SOF NEO to a combined intervention. Unfortunately and probably because the operation was run by Commander US Second Fleet without the Caribbean contacts and the sensitivity of USFORCARIB, what little there was of a Supreme Headquarters on the Commonwealth Caribbean side was kept out of the bigger picture. There was no exchange of liaison officers at the

highest level. The commander of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force had expected the Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force to have been co-located with Commander Second Fleet aboard the USS Independence and this did not

<sup>14</sup> occur. The fact that there was no real Commonwealth Caribbean political or military command above the level of the CPF HQ did not become important because the operation was of such short duration and with the cessation of hostilities the force was effectively at the disposal of the Grenadian Governor General.

It is interesting to note that there were no officers in the CPF HQ that had been trained at the US Army Command and General Staff College and consequently none that had any intimate knowledge of US doctrine, or systems and this fact might have lessened the usefulness of a reciprocal exchange of liaison officers. It also contributed to CPF perplexity at the lack of progress of the 82nd Airborne and many may have come away from the operation with the perception that this performance was the US norm.

This lack of coordination typified many aspects of the operations particularly the activities of the 82nd Airborne, the State Department and some aspects of JTF 120 in its relationship with the MAU the 82nd and the CPF. This lack of coordination was primarily due to the ad-hoc nature of JTF 120 in combination with the incompetent way in which the 82nd Airborne was directed.

The major failure however was the failure in the

information arena at the political and strategic levels. This impacted and was magnified by the command apparatus at the operational and tactical levels as mentioned. The collection, synthesis and dissemination of information was poorly handled and led directly to the major failure of the prosecution of Urgent Fury and was responsible for the unnecessary loss of lives.

Force composition on the US side evolved well and catered fairly well for most contingencies. The main exception was that combat support was conspicuously lacking especially in indirect capability. Admiral Metcalf's late decision to abandon the restrictions on the use of naval gunfire after the loss of the Cobras, because of its potential for collateral damage was fortunately not taken up by the combat echelons. This made glaring, the need for precision guided munitions (PGMs) for both the airborne forces and naval guns. The abandonment of the navy surface to surface semi-active Laser Guided Projectile (SALGP) program is regrettable from this point of view. Such PGMs in the indirect mode could have prevented the loss of the two Cobras as Copperhead and the Navys semi-active laser guided projectile (SALGP) would have provided adequate fire power even without the detailed tactical maps, while reducing the risk for collateral damage.

On the Commonwealth Caribbean side, that the operation did not go wrong probably served not to show up the grievous lacks in force structure, most importantly in



antitank and other direct fire weapons. The need for some standing arrangement for the strategic movement of troops was also indicated.

The almost total unfamiliarity of the troops of all the nations (including the US), with one another left gaping holes in their ability to cooperate, and this is probably due to the corresponding dearth of combined training.

That the troops were able to make do with the almost total absence of transport and actually create a transport asset where there was none was commendable but it is a lack that should be readressed.

#### CURRENT COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN SECURITY POSTURE

What is the situation in the Commonwealth Caribbean today? Has there been a significant improvement in the capability of the military forces to respond to a situation such as Grenada, or in fact a more severe and demanding contingency? Since 1983 the Commonwealth Caribbean has been propelled on the tide of the political momentum generated by the Grenada crisis to expand the Regional Security System from five to seven nations, now including Grenada and St. Kitts Nevis. The initial trend was to  
28  
greater fulfillment of the Adams Doctrine which called for fast highly mobile conventional military forces capable of being a credible deterrent to the whole threat spectrum from conventional war to drug interdiction. No sooner had combat on Grenada cooled than MTTs from Fort Bragg were training the SSUs of the RSS. For a time after Urgent Fury

increased funds were made available for the RSS from the US. The Barbados government took on an increasing burden for the RSS in terms of personnel and other resources. The training focused on small unit tactics and was almost completely military in nature. It must be remembered that the SSUs were primarily made up of policemen. Within the group of RSS nations's only Barbados and Antigua had defense forces. Some coast Guard training was also given. Along with the training US equipment was also being received through US financial assistance.

The UK has traditionally provided a guardship for the Caribbean (of frigate or destroyer size) for the protection of those territories that remain dependencies and Belize. The military forces and police of the region having been of a British heritage were now going through a fundamental change in their professional outlook because they were now being trained by US Special Forces MTTs. As a balance to this and to reduce the 'tearing' this engendered through the radical professional reorientation, assistance was also sought from the UK and this was provided in the form of training personnel on attachment from UK Forces. The impetus for the new UK willingness to cooperate probably came from Commonwealth alarm over the Grenada

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intervention. This alarm which initiated the study into the defense of Commonwealth ministrates and the report

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(which had a subtle Anti-American flavor) recommended greater willingness on the part of the more developed

Commonwealth nations to provide small Commonwealth states with an alternative to the US for military insurance. With this impetus the RSS proceeded by leaps and bounds between 1984 and 1986 until the Grenada memories dimmed and the normal West Indian cycle of political change set in. For example, James Mitchell of St. Vincent and the Grenadines went into opposition. The party of the now deceased Tom Adams also suffered defeat at the hand of the chief critic of the Adams Doctrine (but a strong Federalist) Eroll Barrow now himself deceased. The realities of fiscal constraints forced the component governments of the RSS to review its budget which by 1986 had Barbados shouldering the lions share of the financial burden of about \$240,000 or 49% and the other partners 51% or \$35,000 each. This and other aspects of the RSS were becoming uncomfortable for the Region's governments. In addition to being a Barbadian financial liability the Barbadian majority share was becoming for the other governments a political liability and concern was expressed that this Barbadian monopoly of the RSS support infrastructure demanded Barbadian agreement before RSS action could be taken. This could restrict the freedom of action of the majority of the participants if they were inclined to act without Barbadian consent. As Caribbean financial constraints tightened so too did US constraints. The jaws of the Gramm-Rudman legislation were rapidly closing on the US administration, and the ripple effect of the slowing of the

US Defense Department Budget threatened a number of programs especially the Security Assistance program. The freezing and subsequent reduction of the Budget, was, at the level of the Commonwealth-Caribbean not a mere ripple but a disastrous shock because it at a stroke completely eliminated the equipment procurement element of the assistance.

By this time Jamaica which had been a participant with the RSS nations in Urgent Fury had withdrawn to the Western Caribbean. The Jamaica Defence Force had however discarded its traditional reluctance at US overtures and had been in receipt of gradually increasing US aid for equipment and training.

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In order to re-evaluate its training, doctrine and even indirectly its philosophical bases an RSS training study team was commissioned in March 1986 with the intention of establishing a regional approach to RSS training and to reduce the dependence of the RSS on Barbados. The team visited all the participant nations and met at length with the Security Chiefs. Their study was based on training to meet present threats which under the existing political constraints was limited to Internal Security Emergencies, terrorist activities, protection of VIPs The Defense of static key points and lastly counterinsurgency against a small group of armed insurgents/mercenaries operating in urban, jungle or mountainous environment. The terms of reference expressed

concern that the previous SSU training was not geared to the Internal Security (IS) role and therefore the units would be unsuitable in an environment that has an intensity lower than that of conventional conflict.

A combination of budgeting constraints in the absence of an urgent 'Grenada situation' and traditional anti-military political sentiment in the Region had robbed the RSS and its wider West Indian implications of the momentum gained in the Grenada crisis.

Dominica remains firmly anti-military but pro-defense, in opposition James Mitchell one of the intervention Prime Ministers declares emphatically that he is...<sup>33</sup> "appalled at having his country militarised".

<sup>32</sup>  
The Team reported in this political spirit and to a lesser extent the financial restraints. The recommendations reflected the concern for dealing almost exclusively with the lower level threats and including a larger proportion of police type training. Thus the training scope was in two blocks; a common training block which incorporated the IS and police type training and a military block. This would enable those security chiefs who wished to withdraw their units prior to the military training to do so. The policemen so trained would however be required to be in an SSU as US military personnel are prohibited by US law to train them otherwise. An annual Security Chiefs training conference would be established to more accurately reflect the needs of the component nations

and also possibly reflect less traumatically than any other forum the constantly changing political attitudes. A means of integrating more closely the divergent systems and doctrine of the more stable UK training personnel and the more mobile US training teams was recommended. The inclusion of a senior UK police officer was also recommended. Maximum diversity of training facilities throughout the islands where appropriate should be used. The result was a training program that concentrated on leadership and specialist training. The programme devoted 130 hrs to common training particularly applicable to police units versus 89 hr to military training for the more dedicated para military SSUs.

In the meantime developments in Jamaica proceeded apace as the Jamaica Defense Force with an already wide training base throughout the Commonwealth was now becoming more involved in securing equipment and training in the US. In addition the Jamaica Constabulary had established a new and very modern Police Academy in Jamaica and had staffed it with very competent local and UK Police Instructors. The facilities were thrown open to the entire Commonwealth Caribbean and many commenced sending trainees to this academy. The JDF had already a significant military training base and had already been training members of the Regional Defense Forces in military leadership and technical subjects. Jamaica also regularly hosted the Bermuda Regiment a Battalion sized Reserve Force in its

annual training camp providing training facilities and logistic support. A quarterly platoon sized exchange of Jamaica National Reserve Forces and the Puerto Rico National Guard has also been in progress as well as an annual company group sized exchange with the United Kingdom. The JDF had also in the past provided individual officers and senior NCOs on secondment outside the Region and a Training team in Aircraft maintenance to Guyana. The JDF now began to participate regularly in RSS annual training by committing a Ranger platoon and a Company Group Headquarters to the effort. The annual RSS exercise for 1987, Exercise Tradewinds was held in Jamaica under the auspices of the JDF involving troops from the seven RSS nations, elements of the Infantry Battalion of the JDF then on its training rotation and Special forces elements and Blackhawk helicopters of the US Army Special Forces Group. The focus of the exercise was counter-in-surgency. An operational success the exercise also reportedly represented a significant improvement in the willingness of the forces of the different nations to work and live together down to the individual level.

On the levels of Combat Support and Sustainment the Nations of the Region outside of Guyana have very few heavy support weapons, the armament of the Regions' Coast Guard Boats and the 81mm mortars of the JDF being the heaviest. There (See Annex C) is however relatively good commonality of weapons and equipment at the small arms level. In the

area of aircraft, ground transport and communication equipment commonality is far less. In the areas of organization, training and doctrine amongst the military forces there is great commonality due to the common British colonial heritage. The greatest difficulty exists when attempts are made to convert the equally British Police systems into a viable para-military system and then integrate them into the military systems. The results tend 'not to compute' and consequently are belatedly alarming the respective regional governments with the potential for military coups.

That the need exists, for the Regions' nations to have a viable defense is unchallengeable, the form it takes is the source of the debate. The conversion of Policemen into viable military forces and limiting their roles to low level threats and yet enforce their retention of police character as insurance against military coups is an exercise in self-delusion. It also surrenders the defense against higher level threats and arguably some of the low-level threats to the bigger powers particularly the US. However the US, depending on the domestic political climate may or may not be prepared to assist or, may demand a higher political price than regional politicians are willing to pay. As much as the military must be separated from politics to preserve the integrity of democratic society so too it can be argued must the police remain separated from the military in order to preserve the



character of individual freedoms of democratic society. A Policeman with the discipline cohesion and training in the wholesale application of violence with all its implications, is no less a military man than a soldier with the same training. His personal contacts and training in the interpersonal methods of policing could arguably make him a more prone candidate for the politics of violence than a more politically and socially naive professional military man.

With the drying up of US military funds for the Caribbean area in the 1988 budget cuts <sup>34</sup> USFORCARIB which has responsibility for managing the military aid program for the Caribbean Basin has found itself scrambling around for funds to continue the momentum of RSS training and building general defense cohesion in the Region. This subunified command is dealing with the perplexing problem that, alternative sources of funding are not under its control or even within its sphere of influence. In fact the lament of St. Vincent New Grenadines Party "we want roads and an international airport for St Vincent .... we want food, technology and cash not guns please", reflects a very distinct lack of cohesion and "connect" between the agencies administering aid in whatever form to the region. <sup>33</sup> DEA funds for example sometimes operates at crosspurposes with military aid resulting in at best lack of commonality in technology and systems and at worst <sup>12</sup> downright waste. This reflects the parallel

disconnects that occurred between the State Department and the Authorities of the Medical School and the military establishments during Operation Urgent Fury, which contributed so much to the information vacuum. The problem may be partially solved by reprogramming and coordinating DEA dollars and military aid dollars destined for other countries not enjoying the same level of political acceptability with the US.

Concurrent to the hesitant, decaying progress of the RSS even with involvement of the larger Jamaica, the other West Indian Nations not involved in Urgent Fury continue not to be involved in the many joint defense planning and training efforts. Notable among these are Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Belize each of which have regular military forces generally larger than the others except Jamaica which is second only to Guyana's in size. On the other hand however military expenditures reflect a different picture with Trinidad and Tobago having the largest per-soldier military budget as per ANNEC C. Of these other nations Guyana with its professional but highly politicized military remains generally aloof of the West Indian defense activity. Trinidad and Tobago although in receipt of US Aid has not pursued any Regional defense aims since the halting discussions of 1975/76 with Barbados following the clandestine use by Cuba of Barbados as a transit stop for its Angola Operation. In fact this reluctance to cooperate on the part of her New World

relatives has afflicted Belize since the formation of the  
abortive West Indies Federation. <sup>35</sup> Then the Federation  
states suspected that Britain might try to foist Belizean  
Defense on the new nation and stood firm against this.

The sum of the present day situation is that without  
the galvanising magnetism of a Grenada crisis, the decisive  
political realities and traditional antimilitary attitude  
of the region, reveal the absence of that dynamism  
necessary for greater Defense cooperation in the  
Commonwealth Caribbean. Although the professional Military  
Forces of the region are able to cooperate to a  
considerable extent the more constabulary nature of a large  
proportion of the RSS whose nations have no professional  
military forces and the inclusion of the purely police  
forces of those nations that do, create stresses on any  
attempt to establish cohesive doctrinal and training  
systems. There are facilities for both types of training  
(Police and Military) in the Caribbean notably in Jamaica  
and also in Trinidad and Tobago. There is room for  
cooperation in other areas such as equipment procurement.

Only the Jamaica, the Trinidad and Tabago and Guyanese  
Defense Forces have sustainment bases as reflected in their  
Orders of Battle. The region continues to experience the  
traumas contingent on their British heritage as this  
conflicts with their geographic, political and economic  
proximity to the US. <sup>36</sup> In not including responsibility  
for defense against external threats and focusing on the

lower level more readily attainable threats the RSS group of nations have de-facto surrendered responsibility for the defense against such threats to the US, a contingency they are all avowedly against, since it robs them of any political options that may run contrary to US policy.

It is in this respect that it can be argued that the more urgent external threats facing the Commonwealth Caribbean Region are the border disputes that exist between Venezuela and Guyana and 'closer to home' between Belize and Guatemala. Here there is no real guarantee that the Region could depend absolutely on unconditional US assistance.

It is this latter situation that bears close examination requiring careful contingency planning at the political, strategic and operational levels. It is an unfortunate fact that the waxing of hemispherical politics in the 80s toward conservatism was harmonized between the US and Commonwealth Caribbean by "Act of God" and followed a corresponding harmony in the waning from liberal tendencies between both US and Commonwealth Caribbean governments of the Carter era. This harmony like a total eclipse of the sun will be rare in the future. Like the eclipting celestial bodies differences in the orbits dictate rarity in the occurrence as much as differences in hemispherical democracy, such as different terms of government, will dictate that this harmony of political orientation will rarely reccur. There may not for a

long time be the eclipsing of a block of Reagan, Seaga, Adams, Charles to drive the kind of strong forceful action that Grenada required. The more likely scenario will be one of near complete political disharmony, between the US and Commonwealth Caribbean and even among the Commonwealth Caribbean partners themselves. Cultural heritage and traditional associations will be the fall back bases of unity, regional and hemispherical cohesion. In this situation the Commonwealth Caribbean will find itself at odds with the US administration. The US administration in turn will be forced into a traditional fallback position which is Latin in orientation.

A HYPOTHETICAL DEFENSE PROBLEM: BELIZE/GUATEMALA

In such a scenario domestic political developments in Guatemala that would facilitate the opening of hostilities against Belize in pursuit of the Guatemalan territorial claims are not that difficult to visualise. The main occupation of the Guatemalan Armed Forces as pointed out in chapter one centers on fighting the various insurgent groups in the country and upholding the legitimacy of the successive military regimes. The nature of the Guatemalan insurgencies is a significant factor. For example those in insurgency leadership are of the same ruling elite as the Military government and in some instances as previously indicated are of the same educational and professional alumni, and general social strata. One could almost view the insurgencies in the Latin Nations and in Guatemala in

particular as a form of unsophisticated plurality in Government and national politics, that is generally acceptable to the Latin temperament.

It is not inconceivable therefore that a sufficiently astute Guatemalan Administration could direct national attention on the Belizean problem as a focus of National energies and therefore be able to marshal national effort for hostilities against Belize in fulfillment of the national goal, of reinstating Guatemala as Central America's primary power. It could even be postulated that one or more of the insurgency groups could be motivated into action on the government side subordinating domestic differences to the National effort. The "private army" of the extreme right National Liberation Movement (NLM) has offered to invade Belize from its rebel strongholds in the eastern provinces of Guatemala if the "Guatemalan Army was not up to it".  
38

The United Kingdom as the present protector of Belize remains the main obstacle to a rise in Guatemalan militaristic designs on Belize. However in the same way that the political climate of this hemisphere waxes and wanes so too can the British disposition to help be expected to wax and wane in tune with British politics and British Economics. In the case of Great Britain however when the 'current political climate' element of national will wanes away from the Commonwealth Caribbean the element of 'cultural heritage' and traditional associations can be

expected to maintain British political orientation  
39  
pro-Caribbean and vice-versa. This waning would  
express itself as a matter of degree and extent of  
commitment vis a vis the US which for the corresponding  
reason could go beyond this to a possible situation of near  
hostility on the side of Guatemala.

Guatemala would certainly be tempted to take military  
action if there was a sensing that Britain would not be  
politically inclined to commit troops to Belize in defense  
of the state, especially if in the pursuit of a diplomatic  
solution Britain pressed her open favor for a territorial  
40  
compromise. It would be conceivable for a UK  
Government to place territorial conditions on her military  
support, effectively inviting Guatemala to take what she  
can as long as some definable Belize is left. Naturally no  
Belizean Government could tolerate this in view of the  
historical conditions and the awful precedent that this  
would set for its long term relations with Guatemala.  
This is especially so as Guatemalas original claim is to  
all of Belize which if pursued would revive the dormant  
41  
Mexican claim.

Such a precedent would be imminently disastrous for the  
whole Commonwealth Caribbean and with the tentative  
exception of Jamaica would open the way for Latin American  
designs on the whole Antillean chain. I would suggest that  
this is possible in the current International atmosphere,  
not to mention the potential for it in an atmosphere of

International tension or limited World War. In this latter case the tentative exception of Jamaica from this could  
42  
disappear.

It would therefore behoove the Commonwealth Caribbean to staunchly back Belize in the defense of her entire territory being in a position to count on some United Kingdom support and with at best US neutrality or more ominously US hostility. It is important to note that in connection with the potential for US hostility that Cuba with a historical grudge against Guatemala for harbouring the Bay of Pigs invaders, has made an unsolicited offer to Belize of open-ended military aid which the Belizean government refused in order to "avoid problems with the  
43  
USA."

If Belize were left with no other large power option she might be tempted to pursue the offer of Cuban aid with all its attendant political problems, the most major of which is to invoke the definitive hostility of the USA. It is not inconceivable that if Commonwealth Caribbean politics waxed left, the potential for some sort of vague Cuba-Belize-Commonwealth Caribbean association in the security of Belize is possible. In this instance possibly (but not necessarily) distancing even the UK further.

It is however the more moderate scenario that is postulated here in which Britain is prepared to provide combat support and air defense of Belize's single long runway airport and the prevention of the Guatemalan navy



from operating outside of those areas which Britain is willing to cede to Guatemala in exchange for Belizean security.

As indicated in ANNEX C the Guatemalan Armed Forces is a large comprehensive military force with a highly professional officer corps that has waged a largely successful counter-insurgency campaign for some decades. They could field a force of three (3) divisions with one of them containing some armoured assets each with its own transport, artillery, engineers, helicopter aviation and services. In addition there are two (2) air deployable Special Forces Battalions, and an amphibious battalion of naval marines. These forces could call on airforce support comprising Cessna A37B and PC7s in the ground attack role, as well as sufficient fixed wing transport to move one infantry battalion at a time and sufficient rotary wing lift to transport an infantry company at a time. A mobilisable reserve of equivalent size to the active military force could take over a much reduced counterinsurgency role in the event a corps sized (not corps organized) Guatemalan Army were committed to the invasion of Belize. It is also highly probable that the army of the National liberation movement could be committed in a spetsnaz and guerilla role deep in Belizean territory prior to the opening of conventional hostilities. This could add up to 1000 irregulars to the national effort. Guatemala could also be expected to bolster those areas in

which they are currently weak such as anti-aircraft capability, and sufficient armoured troop transport to create at least one light mechanized brigade. Antiship missiles for its naval patrol craft and bridging equipment would also be required, and could be obtained as far away as China.

The long land border between Belize and Guatemala provides for the determined aggressor a large potential for ground strategic approaches that could support a prolonged  
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campaign of gradual subjugation of Belize.

There are however some key strategic points as per ANNEX D. One is the main road running along the Belmopan Belize City Axis and is the only viable high speed motorised approach it also contains the vital suspension bridge across the Belize river that would hold up such an advance. Punta Gorda the center of oil and mineral exploration activity is within the region that Great Britain was willing to cede to Guatemala south of 16° 30' N. This port is within easy reach of Puerto Barrios, Guatemala's sole Caribbean Port and at which the bulk of the Guatemalan Navy is now home ported. The key strategic point is however the Belize Airport which has the country's sole runway capable of handling a rapid build up of  
44  
reinforcing friendly troops. The long eastern border and the southern border through the Maya Mountains provide good infiltration routes for dismounted infantry. Once Punta Gorda was secured however this opens up the coast

roads for an mechanised/motorized thrust up the coast.

A guatemalan campaign plan could take either of two options. In the first option the campaign could take two phases one to seize the region south of 16° 30' including Punta Gorda simultaneously initiating guerilla activities with the NLM in the North to disperse the Belizean defence effort. This phase would be consolidated with the improvement of the road communications in the Punta Gorda area. The second phase would be a combined thrust along the Belmophan Belize City Axis and another along the Punta Gorda Belize City Axis. The main effort being decided depending on whether the choke points along either axis are secure or attainable and on the deployment of the Belizean defences. The second option would envisage the massing of two divisions with a view of seizing the Punta Gorda region as a diversionary maneuver then in a lightning campaign, to seize first the Belize highway bridge and a landing strip for the Aravas and C47s, building up sufficient troops (2 battalions initially) for a ground assault on Belize City Airport. This would be followed by a mechanized/motorized advance on Belmopan Belize City and a combined amphibious land assault on Punta Gorda leading to a second thrust along Punta Gorda Belize City protected by naval patrol craft operating with the SSMS in coastal waters. If the Guatemalans were able to secure the Airport and the Belmopan Belize City access the defense would be unhinged and could disintegrate. If the defense appeared to be

falling apart Mexico might be encouraged to advance from the North to secure her own claim to Belizean territory, thus opening up a third 'front'. The terrain in Belize which is primarily tropical jungle would dictate warfare similar to that waged by the victorious Japanese in their mainland campaign through Malaysia and Burma which although anchored to the few roads exploited the jungle maneuverability of foot borne light infantry. The key to any successful Guatemalan campaign is to deny Belize any strategic reinforcement and thus win the force build-up battle. Whatever opportunity there will be for maneuver will take place at the small unit tactical level.

Any doubts about the Guatemalan Army's ability to prosecute this operation after careful preparation even in the light of previous Latin American experience cannot be entertained. The short relative distances over which the campaign would be launched, the professionalism of the Officer Corps, the initiative the Guatemalans would possess and the highly trained special forces Battalions all combine to make this operation feasible from the Guatemalan stand-point.

This translates into a task for the defenders to be able to deny the above mentioned vital points to the enemy in particular the San Ignacio Bridge, Punta Gorda and the Belize City Airport. They would then need to effect a rapid build up of sufficient combat forces with their equipment to provide the operational flexibility necessary

to control Belizean territory against insurgents and expel (or destroy) the Guatemalan's, from Belizean territory.

This will require at least a light division as a maneuver unit, the equivalent of a brigade of troops for counter insurgency, supported by a battalions worth of rotary wing air-mobility, fixed and rotary wing close support assets and a significant anti-aircraft capability. Portable anti-armor, light artillery, heavy mortar and engineer combat support is a must. The force must also have a sustainment base capable of full development in anticipation of a long campaign. Jungle battles have traditionally been long battles.

As noted before, in February and March 1973 Belize had approached the CARICOM governments and received assurance of assistance in the event Belize should need it. Apart from this assurance however, there have been no further actions. As can be seen from ANNEX C, between them, these nations could not field the required forces even with their total forces committed. Guyana for example could not afford to deploy more than a battalion overseas due to the threat at home. This would leave Jamaica to provide, at a stretch, a three battalion brigade group by mobilizing all the resources of the Jamaica Defense Force including the Second Class of the reserve and maintain half a battalion in Jamaica for contingencies. This brigade group could be fully self contained. A second composite brigade of two plus battalions of regular troops based on the Trinidad and

Tobago Defense Force and including the para-military police units from the RSS, could be fielded. The Caribbean forces will be woefully inadequate in the command control and communication capability on which any cohesive major military formation is dependent. None of the nations mentioned have any experience with formation headquarters even of brigade size. Jamaica and Guyana both operate force headquarters modeled on a standard British division but neither nation has established brigade formations. Communication equipment varies throughout the region and all suffer from a dearth of information gathering and processing capability.

The most such a force would be able to accomplish would be to make life so difficult for the invading Guatemalan forces they they will limit their objectives.

The myriad other problems that would arise are many and are mainly due to the fact there is no current planning for operating at this level. The problems of working together that arose in Grenada will be magnified.

At the political level the above scenario which promises a campaign of much longer duration will demand some sort of political command structure able to give strategic direction, marshal war resources domestically and internationally and provide diplomatic cover for the war. The raising of combat forces, the policy and finances for the securing of equipment and materiel will also rest at this level and cannot be accomplished by periodic

meetings of heads of government. At the level of force headquarters there needs to be appropriate consultative mechanisms to decide and implement command requirements establish procedures for mobilizing and deploying forces and replacements and establish the sustainment base in accordance with the political directive. At this level the command apparatus in the field and administrative control procedures will also be implemented and requirements forwarded to the political apparatus. It is at this level also that the 'nitty gritty' of the sustainment requirements will have to be worked out and implemented. For sustainment and strategic movement the meagre civilian resources of the Commonwealth Caribbean will have to be carefully husbanded and allocated by the political authorities in close coordination with the force headquarters. The gaps as they exist would need to be filled by the force of a large nation in this instance of the United Kingdom. As the scenario is built however that is the big variable and the extent to which the political climate in the UK permits the gap to be filled will determine the success or failure of the operation.

If as the scenario dictates the UK is prepared to guarantee Belizean sovereignty only down to latitude 16° 30' north then the UK would be effectively precluded from providing the overall field headquarters that could involve operations south of this line. It is doubtful that the UK authorities would be willing to have their forces come

under Commonwealth Caribbean command is excepting the Commonwealth Caribbean had demonstrated their competence in this area, if not in combat then certainly in exercise. The UK might be willing to provide the material assets necessary to prosecute the war provided the Commonwealth Caribbean troops operated them. Close air support and air defense would also have distinct limitations applied. This would commit any forces operating outside of the respective envelopes of the UK limits to provide their own. The extent to which the UK could assist in the sustainment effort would also be limited by the type of equipment and consumables used by the component Nations and as has been already pointed out and obvious from ANNEX C these vary widely.

Although the commonwealth Caribbean forces do have a distinct British heritage there has been some growing apart as these forces have been adapted to the peculiar requirements of each individual nation with no view to continuing interoperability. This is particularly true of the Guyanese forces but less so of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. As the British and the Americans discovered at Kasseine Pass and Anzio in World War Two, <sup>45</sup> being of the same cultural heritage is no guarantee of harmony on the battlefield. In the event there is disharmony at any level of a combined operation the result can be disastrous for the efficient prosecution of the operation.

A particularly critical aspect of the operation has



been alluded to previously and that is the strategic deployment of the troops. Both Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica have significant civil airlines, which possess the aircraft necessary to accomplish the task of moving the troops to the theatre. However it is doubtful that either airline could afford the disruption to their commercial business such a requirement would make if not planned for. This is particularly so when one considers the distances that need to be covered. Jamaica is the closest to Belize being a little over 500 miles away, however Guyana at the other extreme is nearly two thousand miles away. The big question is whether the Commonwealth Caribbean can get sufficient forces in theatre in a reasonable time. As indicated above this is contingent on the airport remaining in friendly hands. There are no Commonwealth Caribbean assets, training or background to accomplish a forced entry. In any case the coordinating effort required for the initial strategic deployment is going to be great and presupposes an established headquarters ready and able to accomplish this deployment. In the scenario either the Jamaican or Trinidad and Tobago defense forces could undertake the planning but with great difficulty.

A prolonged campaign will also place a strain on the matter of replacements for casualties and medical facilities for the rehabilitation of the wounded. There are at present no deployable field hospitals in the region but there are medical personnel resources. In addition the

training infrastructure in the region for soldiers is fairly well developed and is based on the British Regimental Training Depot system and could be expected to turn out sufficient trained soldiers for the anticipated casualty rates in a conflict of this intensity. However, does the Commonwealth Caribbean with a total population of a little over 5 million persons have the manpower resource to cope with an extended campaign?

In the final analysis neither Belize nor the other Commonwealth Caribbean nations can afford to wait for the first battle in order to respond to the potential of Guatemalan aggression. The first battle that must be fought is the battle of preparation, to create the kind of viable defense posture that will prevent that first real battle.

#### THE POTENTIAL FOR EXTRA-REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT

The West India Regiment from which both the Jamaican and Trinidadian Defense forces derive their historical links was rarely ever used in the Caribbean region. Most of the Regiment's wars were on the North American continent as the Carolinas Regiment or in West Africa as the West India Regiment. The JDF has in the past been used in training and developing the defense forces of other nations. There is no doubt that there is a role for either peacemaking or peacekeeping outside the region under the auspices of some international authority or large nation. In 1982, for example, it was proposed by the state

department that in the event the Falklands War had bogged down into a stalemate that Jamaica could be called upon to contribute troops to form a neutral peacekeeping force on the Islands pending resolution of the crisis by other means.<sup>46</sup>

There are several current situations that could involve forces of the region in either a peacemaking, peacekeeping, or security role. These would largely fall under commonwealth auspices and could include mediating a potential civil war in Fiji, assisting in Africa to secure the Zimbabwe-Mozambique economic lifeline or in Southern Africa in peacemaking. Again the requirements for interoperability rise up dictating the need for the kinds of capabilities already detailed. These would include in particular, the strategic deployment requirement, the ability to field or contribute to higher level formation headquarters, be able to adapt to other environments other than the tropical zone. Some additional requirements might include the support of personnel and their families overseas for extended periods of time and the potential to coordinate the sustainment of a fighting force over vast distances. In this instance the present policy of the JDF in training its officers with the Forces of Commonwealth Nations as far apart as Canada and India need to be considered.

## ENDNOTES

### CHAPTER 5

1. Anderson. Operation Urgent Fury. Alert 1984.
2. Bolger. Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics. Military Review July 1986. (hereinafter call "Bolger. Critics")
3. Maingot. Essays on Strategy & Diplomacy No. 4 page 10.
4. Dunn & Watson. American Intervention in Grenada page 159. Westview Special Studies. (hereinafter referred to "D&W Grenada")
5. Schoenhals & Melanson. Revolution and Intervention in Grenada page 21. Westview Special Studies.
6. 'D&W Grenada' page 161.
7. Economist. Britains Grenada Shutout 10 Mar 84.
8. D&W Grenada. A Chronology of Events page 149-182.
9. Commonwealth Heads of Government.. The New Delhi communique' November 1983 page 8 para 9-11 gives the impression that faced with the unchallengeable correctness of the Joint US/Commonwealth Caribbean action fear of 'the precedent' overrode considerations of 'rightness'. See also D&W Grenada page 181.
10. 'Bolger. Critics'.
11. Butler Steven M. United States Forces Caribbean. Student Text 20-8 Mar 1988.
12. Butler Steven M. Interview with the author.
13. Spectre Ron. US Marines in Grenada.
14. Barnes Ken. Interview with the author.
15. The term 'Ranger Company' refers to the British concept of Rangers as opposed to the American and are simply light infantry armed and equipped for jungle Warfare. They are generally transported in wheeled transport in platoon sized increments.
16. Anderson. Operation Urgent Fury.
17. Bolger. Critics.
18. There was some evidence of attempts at externally influenced destabilization of the PRG such as the assassination attempt on the Venezuelan Ambassador (See Schoenhals & Melanson page 63). This however could have been self inflicted as internal convulsions were already wracking the PRG.

19. Doe Charles. Defense Trends Army Times 5 November 1984.
20. Shoenhals & Melanson pages 61 & 63.
21. Spectre Ron page 21.
22. Spectre Ron page 16.
23. Public Television. Frontline: Operation Urgent Fury
24. Spectre Ron. page 21.
25. Spectre, Ron. page 22.
26. Sufficient individual assault weapons were discovered to equip the equivalent of Fifteen Battalions in Infantry. This is in addition to the crew served weapons and large quantities of ammunition.
27. D&W Grenada page 176.
28. Maingot. Essays on Strategy and diplomacy No. 4 page 9.
29. Commonwealth Heads of Government: The New Delhi Communique' page 8.
30. Commonwealth Consultative Group. Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society. See especially page 29 para 3-27 for the unwarranted Anti-American undertone. The implication in the paragraph is that the United States acted unilaterally and that the Commonwealth Caribbean was irrelevant to the decision-making process and the Intervention. See also Maingot Essays on strategy and diplomacy No. 4 page 14 "...spheres of influence are often desired by weaker states .... the stronger power is as much invited as inviting itself..."
31. Graham. Briefs and Agenda. Brief; Enhancement of the RSS Operational, Logistic and Administrative capability. para 2. "For a number of reasons the RSS cannot continue to be so dependent upon the BDF, .....the Barbados Government may choose not to be involved in a particular RSS operation..."
32. Jackson L. Regional Security System Training Study Team Final Report 4 July 86. The report limited consideration of the threat scenario from that of defense against attack to Internal Security and more police oriented duties.
33. Diedrich B. The End of West Indian Innocence. Caribbean Review.
34. Washington Post. Cutbacks force US to slash Foreign Aid. Kansas City Times Sat 30 Jan 1988.

35. See Chapter One for a discussion of the Commonwealth Caribbean Threat Scenario and the conflict that may be faced if the US had to choose politically between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America. Also see Commonwealth Consultative Group: Vulnerability, for a discussion on the effects on Caribbean Security to the presence of the US.
36. Commonwealth Consultative Group. Vulnerability Chapter 2.
37. Commonwealth Caribbean political orientation changes in accordance with numerous factors such as race, economics, mood and downright 'cussedness'. Harmony with each other and the US is therefore difficult to achieve. See Chapter One for a discussion on this variableness in the Third World and Maingots. United States in the Caribbean, Geopolitics and the Bargaining Capacity of Small States.
38. Keegan: World Armies page 273.
39. During the 1982 Falklands War Commonwealth Caribbean States along with the United States and Chile formed a sufficiently large voting bloc to forstall an OAS attempt to respond en-masse to 'British Aggression against an OAS member state'.
40. Border and Territorial Disputes page 350. Britain was willing to cede the Punta Gorda region in South Belize in exchange for a Guatemalan guarantee for Belizean Independence.
41. Border and Territorial Disputes page 346.
42. Although Jamaica may not suffer outright invasion it would certainly be subject to extreme political and economic coercion. The potential aggressor could go so far as to demand forward basing rights as a bastion against 'Cuban expansionism'.
43. Keegan. World Armies page 54. Border and Territorial Disputes page 351
44. Keegan World Armies page 55.
45. Hixson & Cooling. Combined Operations in Peace and War. Chapter 4.
46. See Hasting & Jenkins. Battle for the Falklands.

## CHAPTER SIX

### A COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN REGIONAL DEFENSE STRUCUTRE IN A NUT SHELL

Bearing in mind the foregoing analysis it falls out that any Commonwealth Caribbean Defence Structure ideally encompasses a strategic flexibility that can move, sustain and fight in strength anywhere from Guyana to Belize. Alternatively it should be able to provide peacekeeping forces in any area of the Commonwealth or indeed the Commonwealth area of interest. On an operational basis the structure must cope with the scope necessary to span the warfighting spectrum from low to mid intensity conflict in either a tropical or temperate theatre 'down to' internal security and drug interdiction.

The structure must, in the absence of complete Commonwealth Carribean political Federation give component governments the Political flexibility to maintain a politically independent regional deterrent posture. It must enable them to retain reasonable input to, and proportionate, flexible control of, what would be a considerable regional political investment. This must be done without the control and structure becoming so restrictive that it atrophies into a mere political anachronism unable to serve the interests of the individual nations.

The correlation of forces dictates a ground force far larger than the Commonwealth Caribbean could possible

afford economically or politically on a full-time basis. Consideration must therefore include mobilization of a reserve force with the attendant worries of the regular/reserve balances and all that these entail. It goes almost without saying that should there be a serious threat as described in any of foregoing scenarios, the strategic requirements may be so prohibitive as to preclude the unilateral action of this Regional Defense System and necessitate the political decision to cooperate at all levels with the forces of larger nations, notably of the United States, Britain and the Commonwealth.

It is relatively easy to make recommendations in a thesis such as this that are fancifully ideal and therefore have little likelihood of being implemented. The foregoing analysis therefore stressed plausible situations on the conservative side, based on what has already happened and what might conceivably happen. As has been demonstrated by the decline in the RSS and the imminent decline in U.S. Forces Caribbean, political will is the sliding scale factor that will determine the ability of the Commonwealth Caribbean to establish a reasonable defense structure capable of maintaining the political and territorial integrity of the region.

Any recommendations on this matter must therefore be able to respond to this sliding scale and be adaptable to it in order to be a viable set of recommendations. The case contained herein will therefore be designed to be



adaptable to the perceived extent of the regional political will. It is designed in such a way as to respond to the waxing or waning of that will, in the favor of Joint Commonwealth Caribbean Defense.

In order to respond to a scenario as that depicted in the Belize/Guatemala case the Commonwealth Caribbean would need to realize a minimum total mobilizable force of a division plus along with the normal division combat and service support. This division should also include a light mechanized element of brigade size. Air support in the form of fighter ground attack would be required, equivalent to the present British commitment of a flight of six Harrier aircraft. If a Guyana/Venezuela scenario were adopted at least a three divisional force would be required due to Venezuela's greater military sophistication and present field Army, four divisional structure. In this instance greater air and naval assets would be required due again to Venezuela's qualitatively and quantitatively greater capability than Guatemala. Those clearly indicate the need for cooperation with larger more sophisticated nations.

In respect of control of Commonwealth Caribbean territorial waters, which may soon extend out to two hundred miles, significant improvements in capability and coordination are called for. The requirement here is for permanent forces, bearing in mind that the mission could vary from antisubmarine patrol and air defense capability

to drug interdiction and search and rescue.

In terms of air capability, the Commonwealth Caribbean has no air space control capability and only limited local troop transport capability by air. Again either the Belize/Guatemala or the Guyana/Venezuela scenarios require a jet transport air capability able to build-up the Commonwealth Caribbean Forces within hours to protect vital points and within days to win the force build-up battle. This implies a fleet of airlines as in the Belize/Guatemala case able to deploy a battalion in one lift. This further implies the equivalent of a fleet of a minimum three to four A300 airbuses similar to those in the Air Jamaica inventory. In the matter of air defense, force development studies would need to be done in the areas of air control, requirement for air defense weapons, fighters, ground attack, etc.

Who would supply all these assets? How would they be integrated into a cohesive force? Are therefore key questions bearing in mind that in different scenarios the political will and commitment of the regions large nation partners could fail to match up with that of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

There is little doubt that the Commonwealth Caribbean faces a real dilemma as to how to align itself politically in order to secure the requisite strategic support in the event of any of the potential threats manifesting themselves. The defense structure therefore

has to be sufficiently flexible to work with U.S. forces in the event of a left wing threat and in respect of the antidrug campaign and naval control of the Caribbean Basin. In this case it could be (tentatively) expected that the U.S. would provide the bulk of the resources and coordination. On the other hand, in the event that one of the Latin American scenarios should evolve the structure must be able to work with UK and/or other commonwealth forces (in this hemisphere notably Canada). It can be expected that support would be limited in terms of air and ground forces. There could probably be fair naval support in the theater of operations. There may also be operational limitations on the forces as described before. In this case however the Commonwealth Caribbean would probably be required to provide the necessary command and control apparatus.

With all of this and despite the economic and demographic limitations the structure should be so established that it is capable of eventual mobilization to effect its own defense should the international situation deteriorate to the extent that the above-mentioned alliances have to be dispensed with.

The need for a nation to resort to combat in order to defend itself, can sometimes be attributed to that nation's relative weakness vis a vis its enemies. This relative weakness the enemy is tempted to exploit. A successful defense therefore is one which the enemy is

never seriously tempted to challenge by combat. It follows that the aim of the Caribbean Defense structure must be to establish credibillity in the eyes of both friends and potential enemies.

In order to be a credible deterrent the Caribbean military structure has got to be responsive, balancing its credibility very carefully against diplomacy and economy. Diplomacy, in respect of the care it takes of allies able to contribute to the combined defense and economic in terms of the permanent commitment of national resources exclusively to defense.

The Caribbean cannot maintain the equipment and personnel necessary to deal with a Belizean or Guyanese contingency but it should be able to respond to it in time. This leads to another key requirement and that is timely intelligence. Not just the combat or operational intelligence, that will affect the battlefield or even the theater of operations but also the kind of intelligence that will enable the structure to respond in a timely fashion in the long term on a strategic basis in respect of friend and foe alike. For example, reports that will indicate impending political changes in friendly and potential enemy nations. These will dictate the posture the defense needs to take now, in order to deal with the long term probabilities. It is this sophistication of intelligence that was lacking in Grenada which caused the situation to go out of control. This same sophistication

will enable maximum responsiveness and careful husbanding of resources.

A troubling thing about professional and well equipped military forces is that they are expensive and appear to be a drain on the resources of a nation. Military budgets are usually dominated by personnel and maintenance costs with occasional spectacular capital costs. The investment in training the military man today is a major investment as the technical sophistication of military forces increases. The end result however is a highly skilled and adaptable individual who is a proven national resource, if he can be retained to the national economy after his military service. The investment in maintenance is also a heavy cost and in less sophisticated and more narrowly based economies these costs are usually outflowing hard currency costs. The drain in economic resources therefore provides democratic politicians with the unfortunate choice of "guns or butter", "votes or security". The Jamaican experience with a high demand resource such as an aircraft technician for example is that of a batch of eleven recruited in 1974/75. After seven to eight years service; one continued to serve, four migrated overseas but the majority of six were absorbed in the Jamaican economy because of the demand of the national airline. In the same field however because of the high rate of loss from the military of these qualified technicians and because of the absence of maintenance

facilities in Jamaica for the military equipment, that equipment has to undergo major maintenance overseas. This is a financial drain on the economy, particularly as the recent U.S. budget cuts have dried up the loan funds previously used to pay for equipment overhaul in the U.S. The Caribbean Defense structure therefore has to carefully coordinate defense requirements with economic development, in order to maximize the retention of the region's human and dollar resource. This implies not only regional military integration but greater regional economic integration as well. This translates into a major attempt by the regional structure to concentrate in the region as much of the sustainment base of the Defense Structure as possible. This should be done even at an increased initial acquisition cost.

#### POLITICAL SUPERVISION

One of the most sobering aspects of the foregoing analysis is really the monumental task that any Caribbean Defense organization would be in political, human, and material resources. It would also be a significant investment of time and effort. The main initial task is mustering the political will to see it through and this basically means moving in such a way as to avoid the matter becoming a partisan political tool. This is far from an easy task in the political diversity of the Commonwealth Caribbean. This diversity spans not only the many political parties in the many states but the entire

ideological spectrum from 'right' to 'left'. Any approach to implementation should be unchallengeably nonpartisan. As George C. Marshall said; "It is amazing how much you can get done when it does not matter who gets the credit."

At the political level therefore the principles on which supervision is based should enable a careful and continuous planning effort with comprehensive integration of military and economic planning. The exercise of political control should also be on a basis that enables the force to be utilized even with the disagreement of some of the members. It should enable those members in disagreement to disassociate from the particular action but without withdrawing from the organization or hindering the access of the other nations to the resources of the organization. Political supervision needs to proceed from the decision to employ the forces, to exercising oversight of operations from a strategic and sustainment perspective. It is important however that political supervision not under any circumstances interfere with operational command but provide instead political and diplomatic cover and allied policy in regard to the operational requirement.

The organization necessary to fulfill these principles must therefore reflect the needs. There should be a ruling authority responsible for outlining policy, formulating missions and authorizing resources. This body will probably need to operate at Prime Ministerial level.


Below this body there should be a series of inter-ministerial panels that coordinates the assessment of intelligence and the recommendations of defense policy initiatives both military and diplomatic to the ruling body.. It would also need a secretariat, preferably permanent, that supports the inter-ministerial panels and provides political liaison to potential allies outside the region. This includes liaison to ensure coordination of the many different forms of diplomatic initiatives, military aid and such civil aid that has a potential impact on defense or vice versa. One particular need of diplomatic and military coordination on a continuous basis will be in respect of sea and air space control particularly for drug enforcement. One possible structure is outlined at Figure Four.

In the absence of some sort of political federation, the organization needs to be solidified in the form of a regional defense treaty which legally commits the component states of the region to the structure along the above lines. This would give the ruling parties the political 'out' that they may be bound to a particular locally unpopular course of action by treaty. As in the case in most of the Commonwealth Caribbean, treaty ratification is a parliamentary responsibility.

It is probably vital to success that a permanent facility be established in a strategically effective position from which to exercise overall political



## POLITICAL SUPERVISORY STRUCTURE



(Figure Four)

supervision and military command. Communications equipment is going to be a very important resource because the members of the senior decision making body will need to have immediate access to the headquarters, to each other and to allies in times of crisis. The facility needs to be physically accessible by being in a sufficiently sophisticated environment that will enable it to be established with the minimum cost and effort. As implied above ideally it should be co-located with the military

headquarters but distinct from it. Accessibility to other regional organizations that have mutual interests is also desirable.

It goes without saying that apart from an official representation for each state there will be a general civilian staff that should be regional in flavor and be drawn from the civil service organizations of each component state. It would probably be undesirable for this establishment to provide a full career but should be staffed instead on a rotational basis with the positions being a 3 or 4 year appointment at each level. The staff will also probably be drawn from all branches of the region's governments and academies therefore allowing the trend to and flavor of, regionalism to permeate the region's political, civil service and academic circles.

Specific and structured training for civil service employees is sometimes taken for granted, however its importance in the defense environment needs to be emphasized and each new appointee should go through a short training program to acquaint them with not only the civil system but the military and its sometimes radically different procedures as well. At the upper levels it would probably be valuable for senior civil servants to be given Defense University (U.S.) or Defense College (UK) training prior to taking up their appointments at the secretariat.

#### MILITARY COMMAND

The principles under which military command should


be established are based on the needs for minute force development, operational contingency planning, and continuous control and coordination of force integration activities. Day to day command of ongoing operations, is another responsibility which will include the regional drug interdiction effort. Military command needs to accomplish the long term force development planning in response to the political policy directive. At the same time it is essential to monitor the implementation of existing force integration plans utilizing resources that have actually been allocated. In the event of a major contingency developing the military command needs to be able to mobilize, constitute, deploy and warfight the necessary forces usually in concert with an ally. The continuous implementation of sea and air space control will also be a combined activity probably in concert with the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Royal Navy. Although collation, assessment, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence will naturally reside at military command level. Intelligence collection should, out of deference to political sensitivity, be based on national resources at the strategic level and coordinated by a special interministerial panel at Political Command level. Maximum use should be made of open-source assets whereas operational intelligence should be the responsibility of specially trained uniformed field reconnaissance units.

At the most senior level the ability to create

headquarters to function at brigade and division levels is critical. The ability to contribute to a combined corps sized headquarters either a Guyana or extra-regional scenario is a remote but plausible requirement. A combination of regular and reserve headquarters staff would enable the main headquarters to respond in a flexible fashion to different levels of mobilization and different allied requirements, without resorting to permanent formation headquarters, excepting where the permanent deployment of troops warrants it. The maximum overall requirement is to be able to deploy to the field one divisional headquarters, four to five brigade headquarters and at the same time provide a part of an allied corps headquarters integrated staff.

The main headquarters of the defence structure as suggested should ideally be co-located with the political secretariat and be structured as a corps headquarters, see Figure Five. It would be coordinated by a Chief of Staff that reports directly to the political command authority and is its chief military advisor. Under him will fall the coordinating group with each section divided into current operations and future plans cells. The special staff group should be similarly organized with the exception that the current operations elements will probably be located with the main units on the ground as in the case of combat engineers. Also in the case of air and naval units it is strongly recommended that these being major 'teeth' arms in

## REGIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS



(Figure Five)

the region that these staffs be fully absorbed into the coordinating staffs and or the core of these coordinating staffs. At this level the staff would not reflect service

orientation but will be a fully integrated General Staff. The current operations cells will be responsible for coordinating day to day operations and implementing force integration programmes. The plans cell will be responsible for force development and contingency plans whereas the inspector general's department monitors the implementation of plans, force readiness and provides feedback to the main headquarters of force requirements. The Inspector General's department would also deploy into contingency divisional headquarters to control a combined Commonwealth Caribbean joint and combined allied contingency division or be integrated into a combined allied force. Brigade headquarters would be formed based on regimental headquarters permanently deployed in troop concentration areas. These regimental headquarters would be dispersed throughout the region and coordinate and manage recruiting, training and daily control of regular and first class reserve units located in military sub-regions. They would become brigade headquarters on mobilization. Those gaps created at main headquarters level by mobilization of formation headquarters should be filled with individual officers mobilized from the second class reserve. A similar principle will apply at the mobilized brigade headquarters but not on a one for one basis as at the higher headquarters. This will enable these regimental headquarters to continue to contribute to the mobilization effort. If the operation develops into a long term

manpower intensive campaign, they will then provide a flow of trained replacements.

Recurrent operations in the region, as has been pointed out, will center on air space and sea control focusing particularly on drug interdiction. There will also be the need for responsive deployable regular force concentrations able to respond immediately to contingencies and assist in the drug control effort. These current operations will require combined operations as discussed. The military sub-regions would require joint Headquarters because of the recurrent naval and air operations and the presence of either regular or reserve units.

One main requirement at the level of military command is to satisfy the combined requirement for both current operations, force integration, force development and future operations. At the main headquarters level this will require the exchange of military missions. In respect of the U.S. an exchange between USFORCARIB and the main headquarters would be appropriate. Bearing in mind the Latin scenarios developed this exchange would not be appropriate to SOUTHCOM should USFORCARIB be disbanded. At sub-regional headquarters levels these will entail the exchange of liaison officers in those sub-regions where there are border or area of responsibility interfaces with allies. In this instance it should be noted that these interfaces could actually involve allies outside of the U.S. and UK namely France and Holland.

Equipment requirement at military command level again focuses on facilities and communications. Each headquarters should therefore be based on a headquarters and signals organization that takes responsibility for ensuring the establishment and maintenance of strategic and operational, joint and combined communications. Equipment compatibility, mobility and security will therefore be key requirements. Communication is not restricted to signal equipment but also includes liaison aircraft by military or commercial means. This further implies the same careful location of facilities as required for political supervision. The provision of communications means and procedures for effecting mobilization of the first and second class reserves is also vital to the credible functioning of the command structure.

Training of the military command apparatus falls into two categories. Individual training and unit or formation training. It is upon demonstrated competence in these areas that credibility and hence deterrence rests. It can be argued that the willingness of allies to support the structure also depends on demonstrating this competence. Officers must therefore be fully qualified for their jobs. This requires careful career planning and a balanced training program coupled with maximum utilization of the trained resource. Individual careers should therefore be planned to retain, by law, the service of officers even after their terms of service have been



completed. They should be committed, with suitable incentive to serve in either the first or second class of the reserve after retirement. Training for command and staff is probably the most critical requirement for individual officers and should follow the pattern now adopted by much of the Commonwealth Caribbean. This pattern involves training junior officers in a variety of countries such as Canada, United Kingdom and India. It is not recommended that junior ground force officers be initially trained in the United States due to the vast differences in the military systems. It is also recommended that naval training rather than coast guard training be given to regional coast guard officers due to the heavier naval potential of the regional coast guard. Exchange postings in the naval/coast guard area are also recommended at all levels of an officer's career. Pilot training can be accomplished in any of the prospective allied nations, and careers should follow a similar pattern to that of the Coast Guard officer including exchange postings.

Junior command and staff training for brigade and sub-regional command requirements should be accomplished for all officers destined for appointment at any of these headquarters and it is strongly recommended that due to the large joint requirement at sub-regional level that all coast guard officers complete the junior command and staff course offered by the Canadian forces or a similar

equivalent. This will give them broad experience of joint operations with a heavy ground force emphasis at brigade level. Senior command and staff training needs to be accomplished in any of the colleges of potential allies in such a way as to maintain a careful balance of officers familiar with the systems of these various allies. It is important to ensure that the professional training of officers not be exclusively military but that all officers must have graduated as Baccalaureates prior to attending junior command and staff training and that they acquire a graduate degree based on their senior command and staff training or on extensions of it. These studies must also fit the officer for a civilian career in order to improve his outward mobility. This will reduce dangerous professional stagnation. Any subsidized civil training must however prepare him to contribute to Commonwealth Caribbean society thus improving the chances of his post-retirement retention in the reserves.

All this implies the formation of a Caribbean general staff which must be by treaty super-national for regular officers and also be free of service parochialism. This will ensure that the withdrawal of any national component or components from any single combined operation will not necessarily hinder the smooth running of the organization for the rest of the region.

Headquarters training is also a vital requirement for building credibility. The periodic mobilization and

deployment of formation headquarters to potential areas of operation will be even more valuable than full scale exercises which will probably be prohibitively expensive anyway. Command post exercises involving putting a combined division in the field down to battalion sized headquarters should be a bi-annual requirement. Brigade headquarters should be exercised more regularly. Combined naval and coast guard exercises should be conducted more regularly. Practice deployments (without troops) and mobilization exercises should be synchronized with local regular and reserve field exercises in order to test procedures on a local basis with troops. Combined exchanges with allies should also be synchronized in order to maximize use of the availability of their troops and increase the scale of training.

#### MILITARY FORCES

The environment of the Commonwealth Caribbean particularly those areas that are potential operational areas and the tasks that Commonwealth Caribbean forces are likely to receive dictate a force with considerable operational flexibility. On land, forces need to be able to fight a highly footmobile small unit jungle battle or fight in urbanized terrain in a counter-insurgency or aid to the civil power role. In some instances a mechanized capability is required. The larger regular military forces of the region already have doctrine that would fit the above scenarios. They are however very weak at the large

unit operational/tactical levels and weak in sustainment and combat support. The ability to maneuver and fight large units in the subject environment and integrate appropriate fire support that matches the requirement for mobility and flexibility is the major challenge. The requirement for flexible responsive strategic air transportability, coupled with the operational environment dictates a light, mobile force built around a heavily armed infantry man supported by equally transportable and flexible combat support assets. Infantry units will need to be also helicopter mobile and be able to operate in a limited amphibious role in cooperation with coast guard drug interdiction requirements.

On the other hand naval and air forces will need to be able to establish a coherent air and sea screen over the Commonwealth Caribbean area capable of being completed by linking up with the forces of other nations in order to ensure leak proof control of the air and sea space of the region. As indicated air assets need to be available to deploy forces into contingency theaters on relatively short notice and provide ground support and air cover for them. As also indicated there will be a need for allied and civil support in these two areas. A maritime patrol capability with both air and surface monitoring assets on an airborne platform is the only viable method of covering such a vast zone. This surveillance should be supplemented by ground based radars of the type being deployed in Jamaica along

with a fast reaction surface patrol fleet for interdiction.


The operational tasking demands continuous operations on the air/naval side and contingency operations on the ground force side. There must therefore be a careful mix of regular (permanent) and reserve forces. As previously suggested it is recommended that the force comprise first a regular force for continuous operations and to provide a core element for mobilization. The reserve force should be broken into two classes a first and second class. The first class reserve will have the larger training commitment and be formed into units. These will be mobilized as units onto skeleton formations with a regular unit as the core of the formation. The second class reserve will have a minimal training commitment and be mobilized on an individual basis to fill slots vacated by the general mobilization of regular headquarters and administrative personnel into line units. They will also provide the first batch of individual combat loss replacements and provide troops for internal security problems, should the need arise. Those branches of the forces that have the greater current operational commitment will naturally have the greater regular content. The naval and air units will have a higher regular content than the ground units. 'Teeth arms' will have a correspondingly higher regular content than sustainment arms.

It is therefore recommended that the region be broken down into sub-regional commands (See Map at ANNEX A)

that come under a sub-regional headquarters with responsibility for operation of all the units in its area. These sub-regions will have a heavy content of a particular arm dependent on the local defense responsibilities. Hence the Jamaica/Belize Sub-Region will be heavily ground force oriented and Bahamas heavily naval and air. The East Caribbean/Sub-Region Trinidad on the other hand will have a more balanced distribution. Whereas it is recommended that the teeth arms be deployed as needed the reserve will have to be located where available and be mobilized from there to where the units will join their mobilized formations. In deference to social infrastructure and political sensitivity it would be better for regular units to be based in the more populous nations and the responsibility for reserve contribution be dictated by the treaty on a demographic basis. These reserve units would have a small training cadre of regular personnel who would be posted into and out of the different states in accordance with their career progression. Some sort of national service similar to that operated in Jamaica in the 1970s in which school-leavers were offered a choice of national service areas to include military service would probably be valuable for filling out the ranks. If this were combined with a bonus scheme in exchange for additional regular or longer reserve service the manpower shortages might be minimized. The reconstitution of the West India regiment as a supra-national component of the regular ground force

of the structure should be considered. It should consist of four to six battalions based in Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad (if Guyana were not a treaty member). These battalions would be brigaded with first class reserve battalions of local regiments and when mobilized could form three to four brigades. This would require six to eight reserve battalions in order to form three-battalion brigades. These brigades would have support and sustainment organizations tailored to the particular contingency. If for example they were operating in a show of force, area domination role in Belize then they would be better structured in similar fashion to a U.S. cavalry regiment with each battalion being self-contained in support assets. If however they were deployed as part of a divisional organization their support and sustainment assets would be better centralized. It is important that the units be well equipped with heavy mortar, antitank and air defense assets. Artillery support would probably come from allies due to the heavy investment this requires. Transport, reconnaissance and attack helicopter assets are also a must. Ground transport assets will be primarily wheeled and unarmored but should include some armor for reconnaissance and open area screening. Engineer units equipped for bridging, minelaying, mineclearing and general mobility tasks are a fundamental requirement. Deployable Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (EME) field workshops as well as deployable supply units and other administrative

# PEACETIME FORCE STRUCTURE



(Figure Six)

units are also required to fill out the force structure and should be provided by the regional system. Deployable medical units in the form of field ambulances and field hospitals must be included. Self-containment of the fielded formation must be stressed in the combined arena



and this is especially so if the large nation ally is the U.S. In the case of the UK the systems should be sufficiently similar to lessen the impact of the combined operations. Figure Six is a layout of a possible peacetime force structure detailing the balance of regular and reserve forces.

It should be further noted that should an emergency contingency arise it is possible to field at least one regular composite brigade pending the mobilization of first class reserve units to replace the regular battalions in the first brigade and form the other brigades in theater until the full divisional structure has been mobilized.

The primary regular forces by virtue of their duties are the air and naval forces and they will be generally deployed within their sub-regions. There should however be some deployable capability so as to provide escort, screening and port protection assets in the theater of operations. As indicated an airborne maritime patrol capability in combination with a fleet of patrol boats deployed in squadrons throughout the island chain is the basic requirement. It is important that the patrol boats have in addition to the normal light gun armament both a surface to air and surface to surface capability. The ability to upgrade the naval and air capability in the face of a deteriorating international scenario by adding an antisubmarine capability is worth consideration. This will enhance the confidence of the large powers in the ability

of the Commonwealth Caribbean to be more relevant to defense of the Caribbean Basin and thus avoid the kind of Latin American oriented political trade-off that the U.S. may be tempted to make. The capability to make this upgrade need not be brought about by a heavy investment in hardware and training. Investment should be just enough to enable the expansion of the capability in time of need.

The structure discussed above makes a clear delineation between military and police duties and it is important that this distinction be maintained. For each of the smaller component states in particular the local defense structure and its contribution to the regional system overall should be based on mobilizable first class reserve citizen soldier units whose members will have done a stint in the regular forces. For purely local aid to the civil power duties the authority will rest with the local Prime Minister to call out the local reserve unit. He will also be able to call on the resources of the regional system if necessary.

As has been briefly discussed, training, in order to be maximized, must be carefully structured and optimized at individual, unit and formation levels and for the regular, first, and second class reserves. Exercises must be coordinated to achieve maximum results on a joint and combined basis. The regular training must be optimized to fit military and regional economic needs and be extended by reserve service following regular service. A far more

detailed study needs to be done on the optimal training cycle and the required resources. The basic principles of individual training are based on a short stint at regular service on a national service basis followed by a cycle of reserve training proceeding annually from individual refresher through small unit to major unit (battalion) training. Headquarters staff training should be accomplished primarily through command post exercises.

Equipping a modern military force is the most capital intensive aspect of force modernization. Equipping the force must therefore exact the most painstaking of planning efforts, in order to maximize the available resources and minimize the adverse impact of military expenditure on the local economy. This is accomplished by careful integration of military force development with economic planning. The effort will be complicated by the need to establish and maintain interoperability with different potential allies. These allies are also potential sources of military assistance which includes military equipment. Invariably assistance stipulations preclude use of the allied assistance outside of the economies of the donor nations.

The purchase of military equipment therefore must be so designed as to minimize loss to the local economy by ensuring maximum commonality not just in the military sphere but also with that available on the civil market. This may require the adaptation of equipment to meet

military needs as long as operational capability is not compromised. This can also apply in the reverse as general purpose military equipment can be applied in the civil sphere to other government agencies. The implication of such a policy will be the ability to ensure sufficient quantities of equipment so as to justify deepening the support base for equipment and localizing it as far as possible. This could mean justifying even the local assembly of some items of equipment if the buy quantity and on-going maintenance requirement justified it. It is also possible that in some areas it could justify the creation of new industries, stimulating stagnant ones or expanding existing ones. These could even attract investment and contracts from outside the region. Industries to which this could apply are aircraft repair and maintenance, ship repair, electronics servicing and repair and vehicle assembly and overhaul.

It should also be pointed out that skills and infrastructure developed for certain military requirements are also applicable in other areas, for example weapons maintenance and repair applies directly to precision electro-mechanical machine tools. In the missile field it can be applied to robotics a tremendous growth area in the international arena.

The contribution of the region's allies in this area is important and requires the ability to carefully integrate all forms of development and military aid to the

overall benefit of the region. A carefully structured acquisition system which is able to integrate military and civil programs throughout the acquisition cycle and at the same time not complicate operational effectiveness and maintainability of equipment in the field will be a delicate and demanding balancing act. An act requiring a painstaking and disciplined planning effort.

This translates to a requirement for military and interagency committees at all levels of the acquisition hierarchy and all stages of the acquisition cycle. It is important that the force development and force integration process be a continuous one and a possible system is outlined at Figure Seven. The important aspects are the continuity of evaluation and revision and integration with other regional and government agencies.

#### THE LARGE NATION CONTRIBUTION

Apart from being prepared to contribute troops in support of any Caribbean defense structure, the Region's potential Allies could gain significant benefits from the system. The US could for example, treat the Caribbean Basin not just as a peacetime economy of Force area but potentially so for wartime. The ability of the Cartels to use the Region as a transshipment route for drugs will be significantly reduced. Regional stability due to a more equitable balance of Forces will be significantly enhanced. Britain on the other hand could reduce her defense investment in the Region and focus instead on rapid

reinforcement for contingency purposes.

Large Nation allies can assist the process by encouraging the right political moves. They can continue to provide training and material resources in such away as to enhance the development of the Region's economies. This will require modifications to the policies of expenditure of loan funds and the sourcing of materiel.

Most importantly, however, is the matter of careful coordination and integration of development aid and Military aid. It is recommended that Interagency committees be formed at the Regional level (USFORCARIB) with the executive authority to integrate funds and programs in coordination with the Region's interministerial committees.


Intelligence sharing although a sensitive problem is indispensable as are a high tempo of joint exercises in all areas and at all command levels. The key to intelligence sharing will be willing, cooperation and mutual trust.

#### THE BEGINNING

The conclusion of the matter is that to ensure the integrity of the Commonwealth Caribbean as a viable cultural and political entity, it has to be fused into greater cohesion as a demonstrably legitimate entity and establish a credible defensive posture. It is not probable that the larger nations will continue to tolerate the inconvenience of any offensive nonviable ministates should there be a serious global crisis. The Commonwealth Caribbean must therefore put away the begging bowl and

become a balanced viable partner in the global scheme of things, by achieving a sufficiently wide demographic and

### FORCE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM



(Figure Seven)

economic base to supplement its political strength. This particularly implies mustering the will to drive the development of a credible regional defense structure.

These ideas can be pursued by initiating widespread discussion but more importantly coordination at the ministerial and chiefs of staff levels in the Caribbean.

Areas of immediate potential are; coordinated individual training, combined and synchronized annual exercises, regional military sporting contacts, coordinated material acquisition policies, development of a capable communications interface.

For immediate action the creation of a ministerial council that meets annually to initiate combined military policy followed by ministerial contact with our potential allies and a show of Regional Solidarity against potential enemies. Subordinate to this group would be a biannual or quarterly Chiefs of Staff conference followed by contacts at the military level with those allied commanders that could be involved in time of crisis and those allied agencies that provide material and financial aid. Out of the meetings at these two levels would emanate the directives required to pursue matters identified in the above mentioned areas of coordination.

In the matter of individual training for example the training and career development of the officer corps could be standardized and synchronized across the region at all levels particularly for command and staff training. Exchange postings could also be established from force to force at all appropriate levels. (This may require some form of parliamentary action.) Soldier and non-commissioned officer development would be standardized and assistance rendered by the larger forces to the smaller ones.



Annual exercises can be synchronized to take advantage of the opportunity to test and evaluate regional communications and experiment with regional command posts. The presence of elements of large nation forces should also be synchronized in order to maximize the opportunities for combined training. This will include naval and air exercises as well. Regional military sporting contacts in primarily military sports should be expanded and regionalized to include potential allies to build a common identity and understanding. In this the greater facilities in Jamaica and Trinidad for sports training should be made available to forces of the smaller states or assistance should be provided for their training.

Another key area in which some start can be made is in material acquisition through establishing early a joint purchasing policy and combined material acquisition committee that coordinates all military equipment purchases in the region. In this respect the resources probably already exist for creating a dedicated military communications network based on established line, satellite and HF communications. These could be tested and utilized for command post exercises during the annual combined exercise thus establishing and maintaining the links.

All the above could start now and precede the development of a formal treaty that would commit component states to a path of development toward a common defense structure designed to protect the Commonwealth Caribbean identity.

# ANNEX A

## Geo/Demo-graphics

	Population		Life	Area		Political System
	Total	Density	Expec	1000		
	Millions	per sq mi		sq mi		
Belze	.1692	19.1	-	8866	Indep	Westminister Style Monarchy(1)
Cayman Islands	.0150	150.0	-	100		Democratic Crown Colony(2)
Jamaica	2.380	539.0	73	4411	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
Bermuda	.0550	2619.0	-	21		Democratic Crown Colony
Bahamas	.2449	49.0	69	5000	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
Turks & Caicos	.0080	53.6	-	112	Seeking Indep	Autocratic Crown Colony
British Virgin Islands	.0120	203.4	-	59		Democratic Crown Colony
Anguilla	.0070	200.0	-	35	Seeking Indep	Democratic Crown Colony
St Kitts/Nevis	.0410	406.0		101	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
Antigua & Barbuda	.0700	409.4		171	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
Monsterrat	.0150	384.6	-	39		Democratic Crown Colony
Dominca	.0800	276.0	58	290	Indep	Westminister Style Presidency
St. Lucia	.1200	504.2	-	238	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
St. Vincent & Gren	.1000	666.7	-	150	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
Grenada	.1160	872.2	69	133	Indep	Westminister Style Ltd Monarchy
Trinidad & Tabago	1.350	785.	68	1719	Indep	Westminister Style Presidency
Guyana	.9210	11.1	68	83000	Indep	Congressional Style Exec Presidency

1. In this form of government HM Queen Elizabeth the Second is Head of State. On the recommendation of the Prime Minister she appoints a local as Governor General and her representative. The parliament generally comprises an elected lower House of Representatives and an appointed Upper House. The executive is formed from the Parliament and operates through a professional Civil Service.

2. In this form there may or may not be a representative legislature. The Governor is appointed by the sovereign and presides over the government. Britain generally retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defense.

# ECONOMICS

	GDP	DEBT	TRADE BALANCE	GROWTH RATE	INFLA- TION	ECONOMIC BASE
	\$BILLION	\$BILLION	\$BILLION	%/ANN	%	
Belize	.192	.098		0.7	1.0	Agriculture
Jamaica	2.0	3.5	-.346	2.0	15.1	Tourism/Alumina/Agri
Bahamas	1.91	.258	-.595	3.5	5.5	Tourism/Financial Svcs
Eastern Caribbean	.500	-	-	.78	-	Tourism/Agriculture
Barbados	.815	.200	-.250	2.4	5.0	Tourism/Sugar/Oil
Trinidad & Tobago	4.81	1.6	+.100	-8.1	7.8	Oil/Sugar
Guyana	.519	1.9	-160	0.3	30.0	Alumna/Agriculture


# SECURITY


	Strength 1000s			Def Budget \$Million	FMA \$Million	Population 1000s			
	Regular	Reserve	Total			Men 18-30	Women 18-30	Men 31-45	
Belize	610	300	910	11.3	1.0	17.3	17.5	6.2	British Presence
Jamaica	2100	745	2845	25.43	7.7	299.0	300.0	124.0	Professional Mil
Bahamas	496	-	496	34.0	.05	25.2	27.5	20.5	Coast Guard Only
Eastern Caribbean	391	-	391	.300 <sup>(1)</sup>	10.0	-	-	-	Members OECS/RSS
Barbados	543	-	543	8.9	NA <sup>(2)</sup>	-	-	-	Member RSS
Trinidad	2130	-	2130	73.5	.05	151.0	155.0	98.0	Professional Mil
Guyana	5425	3000	8425	65.0	.05	116.0	115.0	63.0	Military/Police

<sup>(1)</sup> Contribution to Centrl RSS Funds only. National Security figures not available.

<sup>(2)</sup> FMA for Barbados figures in with the Eastern Caribbean as part of the RSS.


# Central America and the Caribbean





# ANNEX B

OPERATION URGENT FURY 25 October 1988



GROUND UNIT FORCE RATIOS 25-27 October 1983

25/27	US/Caribbean
1/1	USMC Bn (+)
2/2	USA Ranger Bns
1/3	USA Airborne Gns
1/2	Bn CPF

25/27	Cuban/Grenadian
1/(-)	Cuban Engineer Bn (+)
2/1	PRA Infantry Bns
7/(-)	PRM Infantry Bns
	[(-) fragments of unit]

## ANNEX C

1. GDP	US	GUATEMALA	BELIZE	JAMAICA <sup>(1)</sup>
Def Budget	US	15.62 bn	192.5 m	2.0 bn
Sec Assist		5.0 m	11.8 m	25.43 m
Strength Active		40,200	610	2100
Reserve		35,200	300	745
Terms of Service		Conscript	Volunteer	Volunteer
2. ARMY				
Headquarters		19xZones (Bdes)	1xMain (Bde)	1xMain (Dio)
Armour Units		1 Armd Sqn	None	2xRecce Coys
		7 Recce Sqns		
Armour Equip		17 Lt Tanks	None	15 AFUs
		15 AFVs Recce		
Infantry Units		39 Inf 4 Sp Bns (Act & Resrv)	1 Inf Bn (1 Reserve)	3 Inf Bns
Infantry Equip		27 APCs	Trucks	Trucks
		106 RCL ATK		
Artillery Units		18 Fd 1 AA Btys	None	None
Artillery Equip		How 105,75 mm		
		Mor 81,107,120mm 6 mor 81mm		12 Mor 81mm
Sustainment Base		Engrs, MP Supply, Med	Small	1 Spt Bn (Engrs (Med, Supply)
3. NAVY/CG				
Platforms		44 Patrol 3 Amph Asslt	2xPatrol 20m	5 Patrol (80- 140ft.)



	GUATEMALA	BELIZE	JAMAICA <sup>(1)</sup>
Weapons	HMGs	MHGs	HMGs
Marines	1 Bn	None	1/2 Coy
4. AIRFORCE			
Units	4 Sqns (3 Combatant)	1 FLT	1 Sqn
Fighter/COIN	21 Lt (T37, T33, PC7 etc)	None	None
Transport	14 (C478 Arava)	2 (BN2 Islander)	7 (BN2 Islander King Air Cessna 210)
Attack Helicopters	None	None	None
Transport Helicopters	18 (Bell 212 206, UH1 etc)	None	5 Bell 212, 206)
5. TRAINING			
Officers	US, Latin America, SOUTHCOM	UK	UK, Canada, India, US
Other Ranks	Local	Local	UK, Canada Local

<sup>(1)</sup> See Attached Order of Battle

		BAHAMAS	RSS	TRINIDAD <sup>(1)</sup>	
1.	GDP	US	1.91 bn	1.315 bn	4.81 bn
	Def Budget	US	34 m	.5 <sup>(2)</sup> m	73.47 m
	Sec Assist		.05 m	10.0 m	.05 m
	Strength Active		496	610	2100
	Reserve		-	300	745
	Terms of Service		Volunteer	Volunteer	Volunteer
2.	ARMY				
	Headquarters		None	1xMain	1xMain
	Armour Units		-	None	None
	Armour Equip		-	None	None
	Infantry Units		-	1 Cd Coy 30-70 man SSIs)	2 Inf Bn (1 reserve)
	Infantry Equip		-	-	Trucks
	Artillery Units		-	-	-
	Artillery Equip		-	-	-
			-	2 Mor 60mm	6 Mor 81mm
	Sustainment Base		-	Small	1 Spt Bn (Engrs Med, Supply etc)
3.	NAVY/CG				
	Platforms		16 Patrol 29-103 ft	20 Patrol (27-123 ft)	18 Patrol (55-133 ft)

	BAHAMAS	RSS	TRINIDAD <sup>(1)</sup>
Weapons	HMGs	MHGs	HMGs
Marines	(15-20)	None	None
4. AIRFORCE	None	None	
Units	-	-	1 Flt
Fighter/COIN	-	-	None
Transport	-	-	2 (Cessna 402, 210)
Attack Helicopters	-	-	None
Transport Helicopters	-	-	4 (gazelle & 576 SAR)
5. TRAINING			
Officers	UK	UK, US	US, Canada, US
Other Ranks	Local	Local (US & uk Trg Teams)	LOCAL US UK

<sup>(1)</sup> See Attached Order of Battle

<sup>(2)</sup> Only include contribution to TSS Central Fund.

		SURINAME	GUYANA	VENEZUELA <sup>(2)</sup>	
1.	GDP	US	1.09 bn	519.38 m	52.74 bn
	Def Budget	US	43.1 m	43.1 m	65.0 m
	Sec Assist	-	.05 m	NA	
	Strength Active	2670	5425	69000	
	Reserve	-	3000	-	
	Terms of Service	Volunteer	Volunteer	Volunteer	
2.	ARMY			Incl Army Avn	
	Headquarters	1 Main Bde <sup>(1)</sup>	1 Main(Div) 1 Bde	Main (Corps) 4 Div	
	Armour Units	1 Armd Cdr Coy	1 RECCE PL	1 Cav Div 1 Ranger 1 Abn Regt	
	Armour Equip	6AFVs	4 x AFVs	81 Hvy 71 Lt Tks 82 AFVs 151 APCs	
	Infantry Units	1 Inf Bn 1 MP Bn	3Inf, 1 Sp Bn 1 Sp Wpn Bn	3 Inf Bn	
	Infantry Equip	24 APCs 106 RCL (Atk)	Trucks	For Lt Inf Div Truck Mounted	
	Artillery Units	-	1 Bn	5 Arty Bde 4 AAarty Bde	
	Artillery Equip	SA 7 AA 6 Mor 81 mm	How 130 mm Mor 81,82,120mm	120 (105,155mm) 25 MRL (160mm)	
	Sustainment Base	Some <sup>(3)</sup>	Engr Coy (Inf Bns Self- contained)	Normal for Div Base Med, Supply etc)	
3.	NAVY/CG				
	Platforms	10 Patrol (3 are large)	14 Patrol (Vosper and N Korean)	3Subs 6Frigates 7 Amph Asslt.	


	SURINAME	GUYANA	VENEZUELA <sup>(2)</sup>
Weapons	HMGs <sup>(1)</sup>	unknown	SSM, SAM, ASW
Marines	None	None <sup>(1)</sup>	None
4. AIRFORCE			
Units	1 Flt	1 Sqn	10 Air Gps
Fighter/COIN	None	None	61 (F16, F5, Mif age 3, OV10)
Transport	6 (DHC6 Twin Otter, BN2 Islander)	12 (DHC6, BN2 Shorts Skyvan	40 (C130, C47, King, Queen Air
Attack Helicopters	None	None	12 A109 <sup>(3)</sup>
Transport Helicopters	3 (Bell 205, SA 361	8 Bell 206, 212, 412, MI8)	34 (Bell 206, UH Allonette III) <sup>(3)</sup>
5. TRAINING			
Officers	Holland <sup>(1)</sup>	UK, Canada  Local	US, local  SOUTHCOM
Other Ranks	Local	Local	Local US SOUTHCOM

<sup>(1)</sup> Assumed


<sup>(2)</sup> Most important assets only listed.

<sup>(3)</sup> Army Aviation Figures included.


# ORDER OF BATTLE JAMAICA DEFENSE FORCE



# ORDER OF BATTLE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO DEFENSE FORCE




BELIZE GUATEMALA THREAT MAP




Base 504826, 546942 9 81





*National strategic appraisal flow chart.  
(Modified)*

## CGSC STRATEGIC ANALYSIS MODEL



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